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New options open up in the German Question

Süddeutsche Zeitung

The comeback staged by the issue known as the "German Question" has come as a surprise mainly to the Germans themselves. Unlike neighbouring countries, which have remained mistrustful, they had imagined matters were more or less settled.

Since Willy Brandt's triumphant visit to Erfurt on 19 March 1970, Deutschlandpolitik has been based on two axioms:

- *the existence of two German states as* a cornerstone of the European peace system and
- the formula, coined by Herr Brandt's adviser Egon Bahr, of "change by rapprochement."

This policy was served by Herr Brandt's de facto recognition of East Germany, which was intended to mark the end of the loss of unity and of Cold War confrontation.

In return for this recognition, including acceptance of its social system, the East German authorities were expected to grant "human easements."

This policy went on to form the basis of the Helsinki process. It has, by and large, been a success.

Change may not have lived up to expectations in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In a last show of strength the ageing GDR leaders have stemmed the tide and even reversed it.

Yet the degree of "human easements," however unsatisfactory, was sufficient justification for the Christian Democrats to take over and continue a policy framed by a Social Democratic Chancellor.

Even so, it is a policy that has been overtaken by its own success, as it were, a success that cannot be attributed solely to the policy of "small steps," or gradual progress, or *to the ideal impetus* provided by the Helsinki Final Act.

The crucial boost was given by Mikhail Gorbachov with his perestroika and abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Were it not for these developments, the question whether what is possible in Poland and Hungary might not be possible in the GDR too would hardly arise.

The Helsinki process was beset from the outset by doubts whether the peoples of Eastern Europe would accept in the long term a fairly permeable but nonetheless clear commitment to Europe's *post-war* borders.

If trends in Eastern Europe are any guide, Helsinki was an improvement, but it didn't go far enough. Nations want more than easements, they want freedom.

The same goes for people in the GDR. Each and every easement triggers a desire for greater freedom of movement, political freedom and the right to a say in how one's life is run.

The refugees, Hungary's behaviour toward them and the East Berlin regime's stubborn reaction have boosted suspicions from several quarters that the Helsinki *process* has reached the end of a phase.

Nothing demonstrates this more clearly than the debate in the SPD about the Social Democrats' Deutschlandpolitik. The SPD finds it hard to part company with the Erfurt categories, yet it is well on the way toward doing so.

Willy Brandt himself has said so clearly. "The small steps policy has proved its worth, but developments are now progressing beyond it," he says.

What is more: "It will surely not be possible to separate for all time what *belongs together.*"

Leading Social Democrats Horst Ehmke and Hans-Jochen Vogel have already gone further in the sense Herr Brandt meant by saying priority must be given to *talks with the Churches* and with Opposition groups in the GDR rather than to contacts with the ruling party.

The SPD has gone far beyond the joint paper it and the East German ruling party signed in calling for reforms in the GDR.

Page 3: Euro debate on refugees was merely a moral exercise; The beginning of new lives and new careers.
Page 5: Refugees, the German Question and the post-war divisions of Europe; Genscher makes a suggestion at a time of upheaval.

The German Question must inevitably recur in any such debate, especially when, as Herr Brandt's comments show, he for one is opposed to setting aside the right of self-determination.

Were we not to want to discuss it, our neighbours *would force us to do so.* They have never believed that the German Question was settled after the 1970 intra-German Erfurt summit.

They have always feared that Ostpolitik implied a desire for German unity, and they find it easier than we do to believe that the "unthinkable" which has happened in Hungary and Poland might happen in the GDR too.

If it did, the "German Question" would certainly return to the international agenda, especially as the end of socialism in the GDR would mark the end of the GDR's raison d'être. So there is no point in refusing to debate the issue, in sticking to old formulas or in *replacing them by new ones such as the* call for "Europeanisation" of the German Question.

What is needed is to realise where the priorities of a more far-reaching *Deutschlandpolitik lie.*

Reunification 1950s-style, an *Anschluss* of the GDR to the Federal Republic, can stay where it belongs, on the junkheap of history.

It stands no chance of coming about, not even in return for neutrality. "Europeanisation" in the only manner feasible, as part of a Europe where borders no longer matter, is an equally remote prospect. So we need not worry about confederations and the like.

We must work on the basis of two facts: that the ruling party in the GDR might *like to embark on reforms but is unable to* do so and that the GDR too is a fact.

It existence as a separate state is based on two factors: the guarantee of its existence by the international community and the acceptance of it by its own people.

No change need be expected on the first point. The balance of power is unlikely to swing so fundamentally in the foreseeable future as to make it possible to call the GDR's existence into question.

Yet the GDR equally clearly lacks a separate nation, and the more stubborn its leaders are, the more they will forfeit any claim it might have to legitimacy. We can't even help them by dispensing with our "obligation to take care of fellow-countrymen" and sending refugees back. The regime must come to terms with GDR citizens itself.

Its provocative rejection of the New Forum as seditious jeopardises stability by driving the Opposition further away from the state. It is also a slap in the face for forces within the ruling party that might be prepared to embark on reforms. The party's hostility toward reform is most provoking; it prompts one to intervene in the GDR's domestic affairs.

For the sake of people in the GDR ties with the regime must not be abandoned, *but normal relations with Stalin's German heirs are hardly possible.*

So the "change by distance," or detachment, from the GDR's ruling party called for by SPD Bundestag MP Norbert Gansel will be virtually inevitable.

Even so, it is hard to frame a policy that will mainly back the forces that are in favour of reform. Distance will be needed *inasmuch as these forces must* not be laid open to suspicions of collusion with "enemies of the state."

What shape can the new development, the priorities of Deutschlandpolitik, take? For one, the demand for the right of self-determination for people in the GDR must be kept permanently on the agenda. What becomes of it must, as Mr Gorbachov says, be left for history to decide.

No-one need have any fears in this respect. The Germans will not be alone in deciding the outcome of the German *Question, not even if* a greater degree of freedom were to come about in the GDR.

But no-one, and least of all the ruling party in East Berlin, can stop the German Question from being more open now than it has been for the past 40 years.

Dieter Schröder

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 23 September 1989)

Refugee finds a sanctuary

An East German climbs over the fence at the Bonn embassy in Prague. He is helped by two compatriots inside. More than 700 East Germans are camped in *the grounds in the hope of being allowed out to the West.* (Photo: AP)

IN THIS ISSUE

■ INTERNATIONAL

Hungary, looking for its new place in the world, passes its first test

Hungary is redefining it role in international politics. It is not the first time Hungary has had to do this. Attempts to place its exact position on the world's political map were happening before the war.

Many in Budapest say there can be no more talk of an "East Bloc" and that Hungary wants to participate in "open world politics" as an independent partner.

In the West thoughts soon wander rather daringly and precipitously to concepts such as "neutrality" or to notions of firm links with the European Community.

The Soviets have been persuaded to withdraw somewhat more than the originally planned 15,000 soldiers from Hungary.

Budapest has approached its neighbours with the proposal of a militarily thinned out 50-kilometre border zone; a proposal which, as a Yugoslavian newspaper put it, costs little but makes a good impression.

Most Hungarians have gained the impression that their change of course on humanitarian issues, reflected most clearly in the country's permission to allow East German refugees to leave the country, is a kind of entry fee for this open world politics.

But Hungary's reputation and credibility would have suffered if it had done anything else. This was the first time that the Hungarian government has had to face up to a politically difficult situation since it changed course.

It was unable to foresee the consequences of what began as a gesture towards Austria in the form of a dismantling of the "technical border."

Hungary has passed the test with flying colours, and in retrospect the price it has paid must be regarded as acceptable.

Gorbachov's Soviet Union showed its understanding, perhaps even latent sympathy; Czechoslovakia was at least cautious; and East German and Romanian hostility was expected anyway.

In a statement in Bratislava, Hungary's Deputy Prime Minister Megyessy said that his country intends not just expressing its views defensively.

This was a reference to Czechoslovakia's intention to build a dam near Bratislava, where it possesses a small bridgehead south of the Danube and where the Danube thus becomes a Czechoslovakian "inland river" for a few kilometres. A dam here would not be good for Hungary.

Megyessey's comments, however, relate more generally to Hungary's stance towards its allies, whether in the question of compensation for the Nagymaros power plant yet to be constructed or to the crisis phenomena life in an outdated socialist system brings for some of the socialist countries.

Hungary does not want to assume responsibility for these consequences. There is no "Brezhnev doctrine", it is claimed, which means that every state in the alliance must bear the responsibility of its action itself.

There are also domestic policy aspects to the search for a new position in the world.

As opposed to Poland, Hungary can make domestic policy changes in an orderly way and without supply and crisis problems.



There is even an impression that the broadening of the economic basis through the toleration of private and semi-private industry is gradually bringing about results.

It certainly cannot be claimed that production and economic activity have declined as has happened to a certain extent in Poland and Yugoslavia.

Although the Hungarians tend to be pessimistic in discussions the reality of the situation fortunately proves them wrong.

Politically, however, the big difference to Poland is the lack of an already established and effective counterforce to the ruling Communist party.

There is no trade union movement along the lines of Solidarity and neither of the two major churches are able to play the role the Catholic Church has in Poland.

If there is any ideologically discernible opposing force in Hungary at all then it must be the mentality of a liberal society.

This manifests itself in the way parliament works; it is effective both inside and outside of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party; is is reflected in the markedly legalistic and legal awareness with which the changes in state structures are effected; but it is not, or not yet, reflected in organised political activity.

As a result all political elements, both the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party or its wings as well as opposition groups, have to operate in a field of political uncertainty, indeed a political vacuum. Wide sections of the population, especially the workers themselves, do not feel represented in the emerging political spectrum.

Ordinary people can be heard saying that they no longer wish to vote for Communism but that they see no alternative. Parliamentary by-elections have confirmed this.

The group which might benefit most from this situation is the Hungarian Democratic Forum, since it is the group with the most compact structure and since it is a broadly-based conglomeration of liberal, national and Christian beliefs.

However, even the Forum has a long way to go before it becomes firmly entrenched in the awareness of the voters.

It is indicative of the current situation that all political groups, including the Communists, like to use the term "people's party" in their uncertainty.

The coming party congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in October will not be a party congress of unity.

There is no more common ground between Pozsgay and Nyers on the one hand and Ribanski with his Ferenc Münnich Society on the other.

Former Central Committee Secretary Berecz would seem to lean towards the dogmatists; he is actively involved in a new club for the "safeguarding of socialism".

However, there is a second dividing line between the reform circles and the centre of the party, embodied by the apparatus.

After he failed to be nominated a party congress delegate in Debrecen Pozsgay was obliged to switch to Kecskemet. He thus experienced the substantial strength of the party apparatus himself. There is still the possibility of compromise.

One thing seems certain: the reformers seem to be too weak to take over the party as a whole. Furthermore, even a party in which reformers are in the majority would hardly be able to win a majority in free elections.

But it would probably prove impossible to govern Hungary without the involvement of the Communist party.

More and more frequently the word "power" is being used instead of "party." The "power", which means the existing government and party structures, still

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A permanent order begins to crumble

These days are the stuff of history books. For 40 years the world has been divided into blocs; East and West, the Iron Curtain, barbed wire and walls. Insurmountable and permanent.

There were no questions of opening anything, whether German or anything else. No matter what dreams of a changed European order there might have been, the systems and the basic power structures were never questioned.

It was a case of coming to terms with the world the way it was: capitalist here, Communist there; at most there was a little bit less of one or the other.

Now look at it. The blocs are crumbling, especially the Communist bloc. Hungary has suddenly become a threat, indeed an enemy in the eyes of the regime in East Berlin.

The exodus of thousands of East Germans threatens the political existence of Erich Honecker and his apparatchiks. The Hungarians, by dismantling part of their border, have removed some of the East Berlin Socialist Unity Party's power to decide who goes from East to West. The physical border in Hungary is, after all, the same border that seals in East Germany from the West.

How does the East German system intend holding its ground if people can elude its pressure?

Yet more is changing than just this. When a Communist minister in Budapest declares that international agreements on the freedom of movement have priority over treaties with brother nations in the Warsaw Pact, ties are being deliberately severed.

By dismantling the barbed wire on the border, opening up its frontiers and offending East Berlin, Hungary has annoyed old friends.

The fact that it is now easier to pass through the border to Austria than to Romania is a signal.

The decision by the Hungarian Foreign Minister to travel to the conference of non-aligned states points in the same direction.

A country is gradually bidding farewell to the Warsaw Pact. By establishing ties with non-Communist countries it is making provisions for the eventuality that Gorbachov might fail in his own country. Hungary wants to be and remain independent.

Poland has changed too. Although Warsaw is careful not to challenge the Kremlin, since Poland is too important a bridge to Central Europe for Moscow.

However, when a Communist minister in Warsaw says that he would really like the country to be social-democratic along the lines of the Scandinavian model, it is also obvious that Poland is on its way towards a different world.

This also means that the lines of communication between the Eastern superpower and Europe are no longer as stable as they once were.

Of course, the Warsaw Pact still exists and even its most progressive members still profess their loyalty to the alliance.

Yet aren't the socialist conflicts more apparent than socialist solidarity? Look at Hungary and East Germany; Hungary and Romania; East Germany and Poland. Isn't even East Berlin, which only lives from Moscow's political guarantee, living in tension with its own superpower?

The Warsaw Pact would undoubtedly close its ranks in the face of a major crisis. Otherwise, however, developments are moving in different directions.

The most important aspect is the fact that the cement which holds this alliance together, the Communist idea, is disintegrating.

Socialism as practised by socialist countries has failed economically. The idea of a just and comprehensive state planning has gone bankrupt.

The motto now is more market economy. Private ownership as an achievement incentive.

Throughout the Warsaw Pact, indeed even in the Soviet Union itself, the demand for freedom and independence can be heard loud and clear.

Moscow is already worried that its empire may fall apart, which would also mean a loss of its influence as a superpower.

The ideas of the West, of pluralistic democracy, of free enterprise and of personal responsibility have emerged victorious.

When Gorbachov began his "revolution" there was fear in the West that the pluralistic states could thoughtlessly agree to his disarmament plans, whereas the rigidly led East would remain intact.

However, the allure of freedom is much more dangerous for a system in which there is none. The helpless and almost absurd response to the flight of its citizens by the East German authorities has made this all too clear.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to as-

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■ THE EXODUS

The beginning of new lives, new careers

The young refugees from the GDR made an excellent initial impression. Everyone who saw how they found their feet at the reception camps, how they helped each other and how they behaved toward West German camp staff was favourably impressed.

These youngsters were frank about their personal views. They were natural and uninhibited. What nonsense is talked in our saturated society about "threshold anxiety"!

The refugees from the GDR still have plenty of thresholds to cross, but at the reception camps they crossed their first ones without the least sign of either anxiety or arrogance.

They weren't abjectly grateful but neither were they blasé, like so many young people of their age in the West.

While still in East Germany they had eagerly gathered information about their new home, as they hoped it would soon be, with the result that they now felt able to behave coolly, calmly and courteously.

The Red Cross aides were fulsome in their praise. The people they help are seldom so easy to handle. They naturally drew comparisons with asylum applicants.

Realising they were raising a controversial issue, and taking care in their choice of words, Red Cross workers told a tale or two about less pleasant occurrences at other reception camps on other occasions.

They may not justify generalisation, but they leave no doubt as to what upsets and annoys camp staff who are ordinary working people and only too keen to help new arrivals.

They take a dim view of being told by a refugee, in some minor connection, what his rights and entitlements are and being treated condescendingly.

They are no happier about someone who makes it clear he feels any assistance he is given is, at best, a matter of course but otherwise insufficient.

Incidents at mealtimes particularly tend to generate ill-will. So a meal isn't to someone's liking or the food is so unaccustomed as to be inedible? There are ways and ways of not eating it.

Aid workers are cut to the quick when food is fussily rejected as though it were an insult and as ostentatiously as possible tipped into a waste bin or even thrown out of the window (as has been known to happen).

None of the refugees from East Germany has been easily upset. None has behaved in a provocative manner.

Being friendly and easy to get on with can be infectious. At the Bavarian reception camps where the exodus of East German refugees from Hungary were processed, officials were firm but remarkably obliging.

They demonstrated for once that, contrary to the accepted cliché, civil servants can be helpful even when time is short and they need to concentrate on the details of the formalities to be gone through.

Wie man in den Wald hineinruft, so schallt es heraus (literally: "The way you shout into the forest is the way it will answer back").

The truth of this proverb was demonstrated at the reception camps, and staff were most gratified when many newcomers thanked them, briefly but cordially, before leaving for their new homes.

One said he was heading for the East German border. The camp official was taken aback. The refugee added that he would be stopping just short of the border, having found work near Hof, on the border between Bavaria and the GDR.

This joke had an earnest undertone. If the Iron Curtain were to be raised, the refugee could drive from his new home to visit his old one in less than an hour.

The ease with which an East German refugee will grow accustomed to the Western way of life will depend on his trade or profession. To a large extent, but not entirely.

The thousands of jobs refugees have been offered are an indication that potential employers might be prepared to turn a blind eye to qualifications applicants may not yet have — if only they are prepared to learn and to work hard for their money, as they have a reputation for being prepared to do.

Closer scrutiny of the camp notice boards also makes it clear that it simply isn't true, despite frequent claims to that effect, that there is no demand for unskilled workers.

Local authorities are naturally keen to *hire trained nurses, but the demand for* humble shop assistants is no less overwhelming.

While the Freilassing camp was still under construction an employer turned up in person to ask when refugees were expected to arrive.

He said he needed 10 workers and simply couldn't find them in the Federal Republic. All they had to do was to bottle mineral water.

East Germans are well aware that two million people are registered as unemployed in the Federal Republic, and many assumed that job-hunting would be hard work no matter how hard they were prepared to work.

The refugees soon realised that this was unlikely to be the case, but some will have wondered whether they may not be looked at askance no matter whether they earn good money by hard work or simply draw unemployment or social security benefit.

Next to no-one was expecting to be welcomed with open arms in the Federal Republic. So the smooth organisation of reception facilities and the wave of readiness to lend them a helping hand came as an all the more pleasant surprise.

Serious mistakes such as setting up tents on soggy soil were remedied at the last minute. Thoughtful details included the installation of telephone kiosks with a call-back facility.

In some cases local people called at the camps with the offer of cash donations as a "starter" for refugees. As a rule they were dissuaded from creating a gulf between "haves" and "have-nots".

But donations in kind were welcome and plentiful, ranging from toys to winter clothing. Underwear and shoes were particularly popular.

They arrived without a single refugee asking for them. A helping hand was lent promptly and without question.

From the Austrian border refugees were looked after by the Federal Border Patrol, the Red Cross, the labour exchange and even the ADAC, Germany's leading automobile association.

Everything was arranged, essentials were laid on. The main difference between the Federal Republic and the GDR, a difference of which many will have been unaware, was blurred for a few more days.

In East Germany fending for yourself

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Euro debate on refugees was merely a moral exercise

The exodus of refugees from the GDR has been raised in the European Parliament in Strasbourg, where MEPs might have been expected to express sympathy for the refugees and appreciation of the special problems faced by the Federal Republic of Germany, their fellow-member of the European Community.

But the brief debate was a disappointment. German-speaking MEPs had the floor largely to themselves. The debate formed part of a moral exercise that encompassed the Vietnamese boat people, the Bulgarian Turks, Guatemalan refugees and the narcotics war in Colombia.

It also included Bodo Strehlow, a would-be refugee from the GDR whose escape bid failed.

The number of resolutions to be passed may not really have mattered, but the fact remains that the exodus of refugees from East Germany was not felt to be worth a resolution of its own.

The resolution as approved included a reminder to Rumania that it was high time for Bucharest to abide by the standards of civilised countries.

The minutes of the parliamentary session unwittingly demonstrate how little attention Western Europe had paid to the issue. It was headed "Resolution on the Refugee Problem in Hungary."

When MEPs' attitudes are borne in mind, they may well be right. If they are to try and discuss all the world's shortcomings, and to discuss them as being equally important, in addition to their day-to-day work on matters concerning the European Community, they have no choice but to limit themselves to discussing intergovernmental relations, international law treaties and international declarations.

That is why they were interested first and foremost in Hungary and not in the refugees from East Germany.

Hungary faces a political dilemma: how to reconcile solidarity with its pact partner, the GDR, and its commitments as a party to the 1975 Helsinki accords on European civil rights.

At the very moment Bonn's Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, referred to a "Europeanisation of Deutschlandpolitik" the European Parliament chose to demonstrate how far Europe has yet to go before it shares — communitises? — German worries.

The complaint that the "German tragedy" went almost unnoticed in the lengthy Strasbourg debate on human rights abuses is not invalidated merely because it was made by right-winger Franz Schönhuber.

Social Democrat Barbara Simons sounded the right note in calling on fellow-Europeans to show understanding and goodwill and to provide "concrete assistance" for people who had cut all their ties with the GDR and risked going it alone in the West.

But to European ears such pleas for East German refugees sound little or no more urgent than pleas on behalf of members of the Opposition who have "disappeared" in Paraguay.

The Strasbourg debate would have been an opportunity of showing MEPs by means of specific examples what people from the GDR really want.

Euro-MPs could even have gained encouragement and support for their own work. East Germans, after all, are most admiring of everything they hear about the European Community, especially the ease with which borders can be crossed.

"We know, of course, that you really do already have everything," they say, and they mean not just material well-being but unlimited freedom of movement.

People in the GDR see themselves as citizens of the Federal Republic and thus of a European Community country. They don't just want to come to the West; they identify themselves with it.

No-one is a better advertisement for the West than the decrepit GDR regime.

People there believe not a word of what their government says. They almost systematically assume the opposite to be true and are so fascinated by the West that they decide to make their getaway and live, at long last, in their "own" country.

Applying for an exit permit is at the back of everyone's mind and the subject of almost every conversation in the GDR. It separates many families in a country that, after 40 years of socialism, is falling apart at the seams.

It looks in worse condition than ever and its inhabitants expect less and less of life. A dentist, for instance, is ashamed to show visitors round the collective practice because of a hole in the ceiling through which it rains.

He has twice visited the West — private visits — and brought back a few instruments he bought himself.

A fellow-dentist who was released from prison and sent to the West 10 years ago after the Bonn government had paid ransom to get her out now has a practice in West Berlin.

She has shown him round, and he feels tempted to quit and try his luck in the West, but he has so far preferred not to do so for his family's sake.

Yet even his 14-year-old daughter is well aware that she is unlikely, in view of her parents' contacts with the West, to be allowed to train for the job she would like to do.

The GDR doesn't let people it feels are politically "unstable" train to become interpreters.

Hours are spent discussing how the regime will respond to the mass exodus via Hungary. Will East Berlin batten down the hatches or is the GDR's economic dependence on the West so great that the regime will be paralysed?

What is more, is there anything the West can do?

It wouldn't have been bad for the visitor from the West to be able to say that no less an authority than the European Community, with its 12 member-states, had thrown its weight into the balance to oblige Herr Honecker, the East German leader, to show at least a sign of liberalisation.

W. Münster
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 16 September 1989)

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sume that the reformers in the East have already won the day. What Gorbachov has set in motion is bound to disturb many of the old power strategists and ideologists in the Warsaw Pact.

The uncertainty is all the greater, since no-one knows how most of the East bloc will remain following the process of erosion and where the change will end. A "counter-revolution" cannot be ruled out.

However, the longer the process continues and the greater the expectations in Communist countries become, the more difficult it will be to turn back the clock. The moving finger writes and having writ moves on.

Thomas Löffelholz
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 18 September 1989)

■ POLITICS

Republicans battling both each other and their image



Germany's right-wing Republican party was launched in November 1983. Precisely what sort of party it is is no easier to say now than it was then, as to two news items within a week show.

• A poll by ZDF, Channel Two of Federal Republic TV, showed how far apart the Republicans' public image and the views held by right-wing voters are.

Supporters of all other parties think Republican leader Franz Schönhuber and his associates are the most virulent nationalists in the country.

Yet Republicans — both registered members and supporters — say that the burden imposed on the country by ethnic German migrants from Eastern Europe is the country's most pressing problem.

They consider the refugee problem twice as serious as other German voters.

• Federal and state government officials of the *Verfassungsschutz* (Office for the Protection of the Constitution), the domestic intelligence and anti-espionage agency, have postponed a decision on whether to maintain a watching brief on the Republicans.

The decision, or agreement to postpone a decision, was taken by both the agency's Cologne head office and its state units; it was thus endorsed by senior officials appointed by governments representing all shades of established political opinion.

The aim is to wait and see how infighting between the national conservative and far right wings of the Republicans develop. The interim assessment is that the unruly Republicans are "merely extreme right-wing" (rather than unconstitutional and liable to be banned).

With several crucial elections coming, culminating in the December 1990 general election, the Republicans are providing entertainment on a par with free-style wrestling in many parts of the country.

Some of the infighting is evidently attributable to the fact that Franz Schönhuber, the only Republican who is at all well known, is unable to keep the party to heel despite the wide-ranging powers he enjoys by the terms of the party statutes.

Since the unexpected emergence of the Republicans as a power to be reckoned with in Berlin, hardly a week has gone by without some upset or other occurring in connection with Bernhard Andres, suspended police officer and *enfant terrible* of the party's Berlin region.

In July he was re-elected state Republican leader at a tumultuous party conference despite the opposition of a relatively moderate anti-Andres faction.

In September he was sacked by the Republicans' Federal presidium, with Herr Schönhuber referring to "criminal elements in Berlin." Both Herr Andres and his two deputies were dismissed.

Republicans in the Berlin House of Representatives chose to abide by this ruling and expelled Herr Andres, reducing their strength from 11 to nine.

Herr Andres plans to appeal against his dismissal and is convinced his appeal will be upheld in a court of law: "I'll win and I'll be state chairman again too."

But the Berlin debacle was nothing in comparison with the setback the Republicans' Bavarian national leader suffered in Lower Saxony.

The voting for state chairman in Hanover was largely a matter of how far, as Herr Schönhuber put it, "those bloody *NPD types" are infiltrating the Republicans.*

Herr Schönhuber wanted to ensure that Norbert Margraf, a former NPD office-holder, was not re-elected Republican leader in Lower Saxony.

But the Republican leader's candidate, a turncoat from the CDU, polled 131 votes to Herr Margraf's 155.

Herr Schönhuber consoled himself with the thought that this would be the last infiltration attempt by the NPD.

Before the voting he had warned that: "With blokes like this, we won't even reach five per cent." That is where Chancellor Kohl would like to see them, doomed to political insignificance.

Five per cent is a crucially important figure for all parties in the Federal Republic of Germany. Poll five per cent or more and you're in the Bundestag, the state assembly or whatever; poll less than five per cent and you aren't.

Constant infighting and colourful clashes between local leaders are nothing new on the far right fringe of German politics. They have been a regular feature since the Federal Republic was founded 40 years ago.

NPD pundits, for instance, are convinced that the National Democrats, who for years were the only political party on the far right, were doomed to insignificance by constantly being at loggerheads with other factions and by mediocre leadership.

The situation on the right-wing fringe only changed when Franz Schönhuber, a nationally known TV personality, en*tered the scene and when infighting* shook the Christian Democrats.

Herr Schönhuber was unable to nip jockeying for position in the bud; he can even be said to have intensified it.

He began at the helm of a troika. The infant Republicans were led by him and two CSU rebels, Bundestag MP Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voigt.

Their common enemy was CSU leader and Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss, partly because Herr Strauss was said, by arranging for a loan to the GDR, to have "sold sacrosanct principles for a mess of pottage."

The troika came apart at the seams in 1985, with Herr Handlos complaining that Herr Schönhuber had adopted an extreme right-wing line.

Litigation ensued, and at times it was not clear who was legally in office and who wasn't. The CSU, worried it might lose heavily to the Republicans, was able to produce its first witnesses to testify that, as CSU general secretary Gerold Tandler put it, the Republicans were growing "ever browner," i.e. more neo-Nazi, in outlook.

One such witness was Johann Krumesz, a former CSU city councillor in Passau, who returned remorsefully to the CSU fold.

But potential right-wing voters in Bavaria were not put off by this infighting; they were evidently accustomed to political skirmishes.

In Herr Strauss's lifetime (he died a *year ago,* in October 1988, dismissed by Herr Handlos as a "sham right-winger") the Republicans polled three per cent in Bavaria, performing better in individual constituencies.

Way up north, in Bremen, Christian Democrats resigned from the CDU to form a local branch of the Republicans.

It wasn't the first time pint-sized Bremen had served as a testbed for *right-wing extremists.*

In the end the even more right-wing Deutsche Volks-Union (DVU) made the running and won a seat in the state assembly.

In the summer of 1985 the Republicans were in disarray. Herr Schönhuber ordered the faithful to regroup in Bavaria.

That assured the party of survival and an organisational base, which was why the Bremen mishap did the Republicans little or no harm.

Above all, their partial success in Bavaria was a money-spinner. German parties don't need to poll five per cent to qualify for taxpayers' money as a contribution toward election campaign expenses.

As allocations are made after the event, as it were, on the basis of election performance, the Republicans were suddenly worth DM1.2m in cash in Bavaria alone.

This partial success failed to help clarify party policy, however. Attempts to draw up a Republican manifesto ground to a halt.

As Republican voters went mainly by what the party was against, rather than what it was in favour of, the party leaders were ensnared by tactical errors of judgement instead.

In the Rhineland-Palatinate the Republicans preferred not to stand for election in May 1987, yet in spring 1988, undismayed by the need to start from scratch in terms of local organisation, they decided to stand for election in Berlin.

Herr *Schönhuber's deputy, Johanna* Grund, hailed the Republicans' showing in Berlin as "both a turning-point and a miracle."

A year later eight of the party's 12 Berlin borough associations felt the Republicans had the wrong leaders and a miserable parliamentary party at Schöneberg *Rathaus.*



Trying to crack the whip... Schönhuber (Photo: Poly Press)

The business managers of the Christian and Social Democrats in Berlin are agreed for once that the Republicans no longer go in for politics, *merely for* clashes.

You only need to read the records of the House of Representatives, says Christian Democrat Klaus Wienhold: "Idle talk or polemics, that's all."

Herr Schönhuber makes a point of seeming self-assured, but he will be an even more worried man in the wake of the Berlin and Lower Saxony pitfalls.

Both state groupings of the party can be expected to produce an inundation of complaints, accusations and documentation for the Federal presidium to handle.

And in Bonn of all places a Republican local election candidate turns out to have come to the attention of the authorities not long ago by singing the Nazi Horst-Wessel-Lied in the city's pedestrian precinct.

If this is to be the trend, leading Republicans say, they *will not* have the time to "intellectualise" *the party.*

On more than one occasion Herr Schönhuber has announced that university professors, Bundeswehr generals and even CDU politicians were about to join the Republicans. But they haven't yet.

Hellmut Diwald, the *historian,* hedged. Herr Schönhuber *announced* that Professor Diwald was *advising the* party on a long-overdue *policy* document; Professor Diwald coolly replied that a number of his ideas were being used, no more.

When the retired ZDF commentator *Gerhard Löwenthal* announced that he was serving as an intermediary between Helmut Kohl and Franz Schönhuber, Bonn government officials issued heated denials.

The Chancellor's advisers, less perturbed, dismissed Herr Löwenthal as an "old liar."

Writers too have shown scant sympathy with the Republicans, except for a handful who are only held in *high esteem* by right-wingers.

A few right-wing conservatives have shown interest. They include Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing, the publisher of *Criticón,*

But after the Christian Democrats' Bremen party conference they may be more attracted by the circumspect right-wing policy pursued by Chancellor Kohl's party than by Herr Schönhuber and his one-man show.

Jürgen Wahl

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 22 September 1989)

Continued from page 2

functions and keeps the country together.

It reveals an astonishing ability to adapt to new conditions, but it needs political leadership and it looks as if this can hardly come from outside of the current workers' party.

Pozsgay and the reformers would like to create a centre-right coalition extending beyond the previous party ranks, as a new group with a social-democratic leaning. This would appear to be the aim of the Movement for a Democratic Hungary.

The round-table talks with opposition groups has only reached agreement on a few issues so far.

Many people are convinced that elections next spring would clarify the situation, even if the political groups do not have enough time to promote their images clearly enough by that time.

The question of the new president could perhaps be clarified beforehand and that of the new constitution afterwards.

Viktor Meier

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 September 1989)

■ PERSPECTIVE

Refugees, the German Question, and the post-war divisions of Europe

As the cries of joy of East German refugees rang out when the gates opened at the border with Austria, everyone was able to appreciate much more clearly just what a monstrosity the division of the continent is. It brought home the reality that this is a scandal, an unacceptable result of the Second World War.

If the speed of political change continues in the Soviet Union, the days of the regime in East Berlin will be numbered — it will not matter if it obstinately refuses to mend its ways; or if it tries to cling to power with the help of inadequate reforms.

The "German Question" is back on the political agenda. State chancelleries and parliaments throughout the world are eager to find out more about what West Germans have in mind and whether their objectives are compatible with their own security needs.

Vague talk by Bonn politicians is no longer enough. Lack of clarity merely increases suspicions in the West that Bonn wants to keep everything open or intends doing something it does not wish to talk about, such as playing off the East against the West in order to assume a leading role itself in Eastern Europe.

Most Germans regard these fears as absurd. Nevertheless, their very existence reveals the durability of the stereotyped foe images European nations had of one another 100 years ago at the height of their respective nationalist and imperialist ambitions.

The view that a united Germany might once again prove too difficult for Europe to handle is firmly entrenched. German politicians must say something convincing to make it easier for other nations to live with the German Question.

There is no need to plan ahead for all conceivable developments in Eastern Europe or to construct "models" of reunification or "graduated plans" of the kind elaborated during the 1950s and 1960s.

In all probability the decline of the Communist system of government in Eastern Europe will not happen as predicted by the West. But, if events cannot be determined in advance, the maxims of our response can.

There should be two guiding principles. First, it should be made clear that there can be no international agreements on the future status of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) until the latter has a parliament and a government which can freely form and express its political opinions. Second, the decision on reunification should remain subordinate to the first maxim, the right of self-determination for the electorate of the GDR. "Yalta" must not be rectified à la Yalta.

The Federal Republic of Germany, however, should also stipulate a reservation: reunification is only possible in accordance with a continued membership within the western Community of states.

This would not only correspond to its own interests but would also allay fears in the West that a reunited Germany would act in a way which might be incompatible with peace and freedom in Europe.

The whole problem cannot be discussed without taking into account the rights which America, France, Britain and the Soviet Union have reserved for themselves on decisions relating to Germany as a whole.

This prerogative of the victorious powers of the Second World War can be regarded with composure. It merely reflects in legal form something which is and will remain a political fact anyway, even if these reservations did not exist: the restoration of German unity can only occur with the support of Germany's western neighbours.

The often suspected contradiction between integration in the West and German unity does not exist.

But if German politics did try and choose between the two this would create a situation in Europe in which the basic configuration of the world war alliances would reappear.

One can only hope that the reverse will happen. As the apparatus of Communist rule "dies out" (Karl Marx) the European continent should not lapse back into the traditional rivalries which existed during the era of the world wars.

The British ideas of a "balance of power" and similar fears about the Germans in other western capitals are outdated. If fostered instead of refuted they could turn into a fatal self-fulfilling prophecy of doom resulting from the frustrations these countries create.

Europeans will only be able to find a better response to this legacy of the past together. The procedure is tried and tested. It is the path taken by Frenchmen such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman *and Germans such as Konrad Adenauer;* the path of a partial relinquishment of sovereignty, as in the field of coal and steel, the partial integration of national army activities into Nato, the acceptance of European jurisdiction and the transfer of economic policy powers to the European Community.

The Schuman/Adenauer method of resolving the German Question in Europe is *as simple as it is constructive: become in*terdependent. This renders the problem of a balance of power superfluous.

There is no better way of calming down our neighbours in their concern about a reunited Germany than to do our utmost to achieve European unity.

Günther Gillessen

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 September 1989)

Genscher makes a suggestion at a time of upheaval

The West today is just as unprepared *for the intensity and pace of socio*political upheavals in the former East Bloc as it was for Mikhail Gorbachov's initiative in the field of disarmament.

Apart from speculative ruminations, no one seriously considered how Hungary and Poland, or perhaps later on even the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia, could be economically and politically cushioned.

There is talk of a new Marshall Plan. After the war this programme of economic aid gave decisive impetus to the recovery of Western Europe. This time, however, the possible donors have not yet been that generous.

The groundwork for such a plan has hardly begun. Instead a lot of people are poking around with long sticks in the fog of the "German Question."

Do the Germans believe and can they be relied upon to continue to deal with *their national problem, which is also the* problem of their neighbouring countries, in a rational way? This question is being asked at international forums throughout the world.

Amid all the fuss about the exodus from East Germany the fact that Bonn Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, has come up with a new concept relating to the still unclarified question of western aid for those Central and Eastern European countries moving towards western-style democratisation has gone unnoticed.

Genscher, who had plenty of time during the convalescence holiday which followed his heart attack to think about the next election campaign, advocates a western "Europe Plan". This plan envisages gradually integrating countries such as Hungary, which are keen on strenthening their links with Europe as a whole, into the European Community and would finally remove the division of the Germans through a new style of comprehensive East-West cooperation.

As in the missiles issue Genscher has again stuck his neck out pretty far. His Europe Plan is initially intended as a means of stabilising the situation by satisfying basic needs in socialist countries and making sure that the reformers in these countries do not founder because of the debt burden others have caused.

In other words: food aid, deferment of payment, loans, safeguarding through guarantees and better terms of trade.

Help from the West, therefore, for all *socialist countries willing to reform,* countries which were not allowed to accept the Marshall Plan 40 years ago. A chance for the whole of Europe?

Genscher has outlined his concept with an eye to the near, not so near and distant future. The European Community should develop into a model for cooperation with socialist countries willing to reform.

According to Genscher there will be no membership during the initial phase. If Hungary should, however, apply for membership some day it should examined whether a true democratic system exists and whether the economic system complies with European Community standards.

Genscher regards the Community of Twelve as a model for a "completed peace order", which has considerable appeal for the East.

He can well imagine that one day not only Hungary but also the Germans in the GDR might transfer powers to Brussels.

He maintains that the "reuniting" of the Germans will take place in the same way as European countries coexist today. He is certain that this will not be a Europe of unrestricted nation-statehood.

Genscher also points to the European Parliament, which will hopefully soon

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■ EUROPE 1992

Efta works out how to sing the same song

The post-1992 European internal market impresses on Efta countries the need to restructure their relations with the Twelve. The six Efta individualists on the European Community's perimeter were long unable to agree on a joint approach, but they have now made up their minds.

The six member-countries of Efta, the European Free Trade Association, plan to speak with one voice in talks with the European Community on a "joint European economic region" comprising all 18 countries.

The Efta Six are Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland.

The buzzword was sounded by European Commission president Jacques Delors last January when he proposed a "structured partnership" with the Efta countries — without going into details.

The aim is to extend the deregulation planned within the European Community from 1992 to the Efta countries with as few restrictions as possible.

After preparatory talks the European Community and Efta Councils of Ministers are scheduled to reach the necessary political decisions in December.

There is growing political pressure within Efta to pave the way now for the post-1992 European internal market. The two groups are already their most important respective trading partners by far.

Over a quarter of the European Community's external trade is with the six affluent Efta countries, and that is roughly equivalent to the trade the Community does with the United States and Japan combined.

But Efta is a heterogenous grouping and interests are hard to reconcile.

In mid-June serious tension seemed likely to occur after a stormy meeting in Kristiansand, Norway. Switzerland in particular was pilloried by its Scandinavian partners as a brake-block and "saboteur" of European integration.

The self-assured Swiss are strong believers in neutrality and sovereignty; they will hear nothing of majority decisions or institutional links.

The Six have since reconciled their differences, say officials at Efta's Geneva head office, and are now ready to talk terms with high-ranking European Commission officials with a view to making swift progress.

There are five working parties, with a different Efta country chairing each, and Iceland, the sixth, chairing and coordinating the whole.

Sweden, for instance, is in charge of the talks on trade in goods and merchandise.

Finland is in charge of talks on services and capital movements.

Austria is in charge of talks on the movement of manpower and individuals.

Norway is in charge of talks on environmental and welfare policy and transport.

In all these categories Efta and the European Community are largely agreed on the problems to be dealt with.

The toughest nut to crack seems sure to be the institutional and legal groundwork for the greater European economic region, of which Switzerland is in charge as Efta spokesman in the fifth working party.

This working party will be breaking new ground, but the European Community is reportedly prepared to bear in mind the special characteristics of Efta countries in the proposed joint decision-making and administrative bodies.

The Swiss in particular, with their direct democracy, their referendums on all important issues and their federalism, have misgivings.

But even the fifth working party is gaining ground. "There are no more taboos," says an Efta spokesman in Geneva. "Everything is being discussed."

The interests and viewpoints of the Six vary widely on some issues. This is particularly true of the four neutrals.

Switzerland feels its "perpetual neutrality" cannot be reconciled with membership of the European Community.

Finland feels much the same about its non-aligned status as agreed in its pact with Moscow.

The government is hesitant in neutral Sweden too, but the Swedish government is prepared to go much further in adjustment to the European Community than is sovereignty-conscious Switzerland.

Austria, in contrast, does not feel its neutral status is a hindrance.

The Scandinavians are chary of derestricting capital transactions. The Swiss and Norwegians have reservations about agricultural protection and freedom of employment.

In Iceland the only issue that matters is fish.

Austria submitted an official application to join the European Community in July, but its bid is unlikely to be dealt with before 1993.

In Geneva observers are wondering whether Norway will soon be following



suit. As a Nato country, Norway can have no foreign policy misgivings.

The European Community membership issue was shelved until the mid-September general election, with Norwegian public opinion continuing to be split down the middle.

So far only the Conservatives have unreservedly backed applying to join the European Community, but influential members of the ruling Labour Party would also like to see Norway join. There will probably have to be another referendum on the subject.

All the Six are happy at present with Efta's "collective approach" to the European Community.

They hope, especially with German support, to agree on terms by 1992 or, in other words, before Austria's membership bid is considered in detail.

The European Community is interested too, partly to protect itself from a rash of membership applications.

At the same time Eastern Europe is showing keener interest in the Efta countries, which have both geographic and historical ties with the East.

Trade with the East is twice as important for Efta countries as it is in the European Community.

More attention will be paid to Budapest and Warsaw, but the overriding objective continues to be a share in the European internal market.

"Our greatest success," says Efta secretary-general Georg Reisch, "would be if Efta were one day to be disbanded."

Alfred Zänker

(Die Welt, Bonn, 16 September 1989)

The social dimension takes on a new importance

The European Community is now seen in a different light by citizens of its member-countries. The "butter mountains" of yesteryear have been superseded in the public view by the post-1992 internal market, which is mentioned almost daily.

Yet the internal market is a buzzword that triggers anxiety in Germany, where many people feel uneasy in view of the alleged threat of "social dumping" in the shape of competition from poorer Community countries.

German trade unions are worried about the prospects for their foremost achievement, the say German workers have in the running of their companies.

So it came as little short of a sensation to learn that Jacques Delors, the French president of the European Commission, had yielded to pressure from the European Parliament and promised a change of course toward a "social dimension" in the European Community.

The much-underrated European Assembly in Strasbourg is not just a prime mover on environmental protection; it is also in the forefront of the fight to safeguard employees' rights.

That having been said, there are few aspects of European Community policy on which there are so many misunderstandings as the "social dimension."

Trade unions in the 12 member-countries have simply slept through the transition the Community has undergone since 1985. Multinational mergers were on the increase even before the Community adopted its 1992 internal market deadline, but union wage negotiators chose to keep strictly within their limited national boundaries.

Instances in which trade unions have paved the way for multinational works councils can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Yet the unions are caught on the horns of a dilemma. Until a few years ago there were no organisations that really represented employees in Spain under Franco, Portugal under Salazar and Greece under the colonels.

The works council with its legal rights and responsibilities still has no equal in these countries. Even the shop stewards at British factories are a far cry from Germany's works councils.

British, French and Italian trade unions have tended to regard German-style industrial democracy as a betrayal of the class struggle.

Britain's fragmented trade unions are slowly changing, but single, industrial unions that cross party-political borderlines are still alien in nine of the 12 Community countries.

The employers' associations have irresponsibly added fuel to the fires of anxiety in the Federal Republic by trying to counter wage and working hours demands by arguing that Germany as an industrial location was far too expensive.

This led to allegations that "social dumping" lay ahead. It is a slogan that has not caught on in other Community countries.

Common sense has since regained ground on both sides of industry. German carmakers have paid staff bonuses in view of bumper profits, while leading union officials have realised German productivity is so high that jobs are unlikely to "drift south" to any great extent.

In the interest of future solidarity among employees in the European Community, they now say, "low-wage countries" first need investment incentives to create new jobs.

So there is no question of stepping up the pace of equalising wage rates and working conditions, let alone of harmonising social security provisions within the Community.

Even so, the chickens seem to have come home to roost. M. Delors and his commission spent too long concentrating on the internal market and disregarding employees' interests.

The European Trade Union Federation, led by Ernst Breit, general secretary of Germany's Düsseldorf-based DGB, agreed last year on common minimum demands.

That led to the idea of a European social charter which Chancellor Kohl espoused at the European summit in Hanover.

Britain's Margaret Thatcher was not amused. She was not prepared to tolerate a resurrection of socialist ideas through the Brussels back door.

The crucial political consideration is that minimum social standards must be accepted and enforced throughout the Community.

If Whitehall were not to approve, the social charter would be no more than a non-committal declaration of intent by the other 11 European Community heads of government.

But European Community guidelines could nonetheless be enforced to ensure that it was implemented in practice. The spectacular change of course by M. Delors, himself a former trade unionist, will make a tremendous difference.

In the past he has tried to ensure that "social" proposals were approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers. He didn't want to upset Mrs Thatcher, whose support he needs to achieve his ambition of ushering in a European monetary union.

But he had fewer qualms about changing his tune when he realised that monetary union was a no-hoper as long as Mrs Thatcher stayed at No. 10.

In future M. Delors plans to make use of the majority voting provisions of the Single European Act in enacting social provisions in the European Community.

The Grand Coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament has shown him to have no choice.

MEPs firmly included provisions for staff participation in management in the first internal market social guidelines on industrial health and safety.

Erich Hauser

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 September 1989)

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is undesirable, not to say dangerous, whereas in the West it is indispensable.

In the free society East German refugees sought, next to no-one is going to spare a thought for them for good or for ill. Past refugees from the GDR who have lived in the West for some time and happened to meet the newcomers warned them that from now on they would, for the most part, have to fend for themselves.

But those who were sufficiently resolute and determined to run the risk of an escape bid to the West should not take long to learn this lesson.

Roswin Finkenzeller

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 September 1989)

■ THE WORKFORCE

Women less willing to become victims of the technological revolution

How do active female trade unionists discuss the subject of the opportunities and risks of new technologies?

What strategies do they develop to protect their interests when these technologies move into their working environment?

Do their discussions broach the more fundamental aspect of the distribution of power between men and women or criticise the privileges men enjoy at work and at home?

An ongoing women's research project at the German Youth Institute in Munich is trying to find some answers to these questions.

The project focuses on the industrial and technical jobs of women in the metalworking and electrical engineering industry.

The first stage of the survey evaluates the minutes of the national women's conferences of the West German engineering workers' and metalworker' union, IG Metall, since 1956 and analyses the facts and figures discussed during these conferences.

A review of the conferences during the last 30 years reveals that female metalworkers are increasingly unwilling to accept their role as victims of technological change.

During the last IG Metall women's conference in 1988 there was an overwhelmingly sceptical and pessimistic response to the effects of new technologies on the everyday working life of female employees.

This reaction is not simply the result of the more recent technological innovations in the field of microelectronics, but is based on practical experience over a much longer period.

Technologies which today rank as conventional, such as advanced mechanisation and (partial) automation, together with associated greater division of labour during the 1950s and 1960s were already experienced by female employees as detrimental to their working conditions.

In the wake of partial automation, for example, female employees in industrial and technical jobs were the first to be made redundant at a time when demand for labour on the labour market was still high. Furthermore, technological advancements meant that job performance demands were intensified, the pressures at work increased and, finally, the health and the working ability of women put at risk.

The women employed in the metalworking industry never moved out of their marginal position. They are still primarily employed as unskilled and semi-skilled labour.

Instead of receiving basic industrial or technical training they could count themselves lucky if they received in-plant upgrading to semi-skilled status.

Women are still at the bottom end of the pay hierarchy.

Such experiences make it difficult to find any reason to be optimistic about the implications of technological change for women in the working environment.

The only improvement in job prospects for women as a result of the technological revolution can be claimed in the form of the growing need of certain firms for typically "female abilities and skills", such as dexterity, deftness, a sensitive touch and a greater ability to endure psychological and physical strain.

A growing demand for these "specifi-

Frankfurter Rundschau

cally female qualifications" led to a marked increase in the number of women employed in a branch which was regarded for many years as a male domain.

However, the positive side of a development praised by the women trade unionists is clearly offset by a number of negative aspects.

The employment of women was mainly increased in sectors with less demanding and low qualification jobs. Wherever alternatives were available these jobs were avoided by men.

For women this meant that the application of the typical "female abilities and skills" and the extension of the occupational scope for women primarily took place in the field of so-called residual jobs, jobs often characterised by great physical and/or psychological strain and poor remuneration.

On the one hand, the technologically induced changes in the daily working routine of women, their occupational training prospects and the concrete organisation of their working conditions depend on the interests of employers in an allocation of labour which guarantees maximum profitability.

On the other hand, they also reflect the existing balance of power between labour and management.

The fact that women have always seen themselves as the major losers following technological changes over the past 30 years, receiving at most a few crumbs from the tables of the "winners of rationalisation", would indicate that the specific interests of female employees have not been successfully articulated and represented during this period.

The labour policy demands forwarded and discussed by women employees during the women's conferences are marked by a striking degree of moderation.

The demands made during the 1950s and 1960s above all set out to avert and reduce the dangers and risks of rationalisation with the help of officially negotiated protective measures for "high-risk" job categories and to cushion their social implications.

Despite the experience that new technologies tend to have greater adverse effects on the everyday working life of women than of men the aspect of sex-specific discrimination of women was either not included in the demands of female trade unionists for many years or only articulated in a "toned down" form.

In the case of a technologically induced downgrading of women's jobs, for example, the women themselves only called for guaranteed wages for a period of at least one year.

Women trade unionists abandoned the soft approach step by step, however, at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.

Although they did not drop their demands for protective measures within the framework of collective bargaining agreements their experience with respect to the inability of such measures to prevent technical-cum-organisational risks to their jobs prompted them to step up pressure for a greater say in the decision to introduce new technologies.

They demanded that women be explicitly involved in the sounding out of the existing scope for technological restructuring and in the exploration of new possibilities.

In the form of involvement in official representative bodies their aim was to ensure that the interests of women are adequately taken into account and that sex-specific discrimination of women is prevented in its early stages.

This is to be achieved with the help of women's advancement plans (*Frauenförderpläne*).

Women's advancement means that women are to be given the opportunity to take part in qualified fundamental training (to which they previously had no access) in industrial, technical, commercial and administrative jobs.

Furthermore, they should be granted access to interesting and varied jobs with a promising future, to positions with promotion prospects, to the corresponding advanced training and upgrading measures, and, finally, to jobs which do not involve excessive health risks.

Despite a continuingly sceptical view of the effects of new technologies in the working environment there has been a reorientation in the demands, programmes and strategies developed by female trade unionists since the beginning of the 1980s. The aim is a deliberate and systematically planned women's advancement policy.

This policy sets out to do more than simply protect women against the detrimental effects of technical and organisational restructuring. A paramount objective is to change structures in such a way that women are also among the "winners of rationalisation."

What is the reason for this reorientation in the action concepts and strategies of women trade unionists?

For many years union women believed that they could obtain solidarity from their male colleagues at work for the practical implementation of their demands just by making appeals.

This might explain why they refrained from formulating demands for improvements in the specific situation of women in favour of more generally worded, as it were "sexless", demands so as not to risk losing the support of male colleagues.

This approach did not get results. The simply verbal approval of women's demands by the men was not, as a rule, followed by any active involvement of male colleagues in their implementation.

The discussions at the women's conferences since the end of the 1970s have reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the traditional approach. Instead of beseeching appeals there was growing criticism of the lack of solidarity by male colleagues and fellow male trade unionists.

More and more criticism was also levelled against male works council members, who are accused of lacking a proper understanding of the true problems facing women at work and of failing to represent their specific interests.

This criticism reflects considerable doubts about the effectiveness of the current system of worker's representation in industry with regard to the interests of women. It indicates that this system is being increasingly questioned and is beginning to crumble.

Against this background it is hardly surprising that the idea and concept of plans for women's advancement — developed in the women's liberation movement — as well as the growing faith of women trade unionists in their own activities has become more and more popular during the 1980s.

The discussions on the scope of the objectives and content of the women's advancement plans, in particular the question of introducing fixed ratios of male and female representation, are far from concluded. But the fact that active women trade unionists regard women's advancement plans as a central feature of their policy means they are no longer willing to unhesitatingly accept a "sexless" concept of workers' interest in line with the motto "We're all in the same boat."

This reorientation is the result of experienced differences and rivalries between women and men and a reaction to the frequent feeling of inferiority women have when it comes to asserting their interests. A redistribution of the existing stock of qualified jobs in favour of women and a general opening up of the access channels to such jobs for women questions the previous male-biased structure and their previous status quo.

It seems likely, therefore, that the translation of the women's advancement plans and measures into reality on the shop floor will involve conflicts because men stand to lose some of their traditional "privileges." Frank discussions about these conflicts, however, would provide an opportunity to redefine the relationship between female and male employees.

The previously used term "workers' interests" could then be analysed to see whether it is still applicable today and redefined accordingly. This kind of offensive discussion style would give women a chance to obtain their fair share of the fruits new technologies can bring instead of becoming their victims.

Iris Bednarz-Braun

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 16 September 1989)

> The report: *"Neue Techniken und Gewerkschafterinnen". Zur Technikdiskussion gewerkschaftlich organisierter Frauen in der Metallbranche*, by Iris Bednarz-Braun. DJI Forschungsbericht 1989, DM16, DJI Verlag Deutsches Jugendinstitut, Munich. Sole distributors: Juventa Verlag, Ehretstrasse 3, 6940 Weinheim.

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have comprehensive powers, as a further framework within which Germans from the two Germanies could move closer together.

This presupposes, however, that the GDR does not continue to opt out of the process of reforms in Europe.

One of Genscher's key statements is that this path is mapped out by the treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and East Bloc states and the Helsinki Final Act.

There is no room for a national go-it-alone. This development cannot be successful without further integration into the European Community and new steps towards disarmament.

Almost using the same words as Willy Brandt, Genscher reiterates in every speech and in every interview that the Germans should not entrust the guarantee for the Polish frontiers to the Red Army.

Udo Bergdoll

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, 21 September 1989)





Tin stars and human stars. Left the BMW 850i, which has a 12-cylinder, 300hp motor; and right the Opel Calibra shares the stage with tennis star Steffi Graf, who likes driving forehands. (Photo: dpa)

FRANKFURT MOTOR SHOW

The car is in the dock as well as on the road

Motor shows are always somewhat ambivalent. At the exhibition centre and in the trade fair grounds the car is fêted as a desirable object. Outside and in the city centre, cars are a nuisance, get in each other's way and generally snarl up traffic.

That was particularly apparent at this year's 53rd International Motor Show in Frankfurt.

As the world's largest motor show began, the city council, a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, announced that it had decided to redesignate traffic lanes in multi-lane roads as pedestrian areas.

A start has already been made, and Frankfurt is also planning to introduce a general urban speed limit of 30kph (20mph), with 50kph (30mph) on main thoroughfares only.

The city is even toying with the idea, borrowed from Stockholm, of allowing into the city centre only motorists with a valid season ticket for the city's public transport network.

So there can be no doubt that the car has many enemies. It is vilified as a killer and chief cause of environmental pollution; its admirers are derided as being held in thrall by horse power and as suffering from automobile delirium.

It has a growing number of opponents, but the number of people who hold a more measured and thoughtful view has also increased.

Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker, opening the motor show, said: "There is a deep-seated partiality for the motor-car."

Yet no matter how much one might admire advances in automotive engineering and technology, problems such as high accident figures, noxious exhaust emission and the effect of roadbuilding on the landscape must not be forgotten.

Herr von Weizsäcker felt a change in the structure of traffic would be desirable. Public transport must he provided at a reasonable price.

Holidays, working hours and shop opening hours must be staggered. More long-distance freight must be carried by rail.

With reference to the motor show's motto, The Car — Technology for Mankind, he said:

"Only those who commit themselves to environmental protection as a means of preserving the environment for posterity can claim his technology to be Technology for Mankind."

Erika Emmerich, president of the Motor Manufacturers' Association (VDA), said vehicle emission by private cars would, in a few years' time, be fairly insignificant in the Federal Republic.

Germany was the European Community country that had made most headway in environmental protection.

Federal Economic Affairs Minister Helmut Haussmann called on the automobile industry to "conclude new and ambitious (fuel) consumption agreements with the Federal government."

He added that the fuel-saving diesel engine ought "no longer to be discriminated against by road tax provisions and by smog regulations issued by the *Länder*.

As for the growing number of vehicles registered, he felt bans were inappropriate. A more even traffic flow held the key to a solution of many environmental problems.

And: "We must not leave the future of the motor-car to starry-eyed world-improvers."

Ideas along these lines on a redefinition of the role and purpose of the motor-car are by no means unheard-of in the boardrooms of motor manufacturers.

Renault's Raymond Levy, addressing the traditional evening gathering held by the Motoring Press Club, warned motoring correspondents not to be misled into believing there were no limits to growth.

Making cars with 200hp, 250hp or 300hp engines was surely not the right way to solve the problems cars created.

At a working lunch M. Levy admitted to having felt marvellous when he was forced, during a French Revolution bicentennial traffic ban in the centre of Paris, to spend an hour walking through the city centre.

Mercedes-Benz board chairman Professor Werner Niefer complained that the diesel engine had been unfairly criticised; it was economic, it eased pressure on resources and it was environment-friendly.

He said intelligent traffic control systems would soon be in use to improve traffic flow. He warned against ideologically motivated speed limits, especially on autobahns.

There were no compelling reasons for these speed limits. Besides, the outstanding reputation of German cars was at stake.

It was a reputation they owed to having been designed for driving at top speed over long distances, which could only be done on the handful of autobahns where speed limits did not apply.

Volkswagen board chairman Carl Hahn said: "Too many articles written about the motor-car suffer from a lack of objectivity and mutual understanding.

"I know the car isn't entitled to be spared critical scrutiny, but a realistic view of the situation can only reveal that we live in an automobile society.

"The motor industry is well aware of its resulting responsibility toward society and the environment and is mobilising all its technical and economic resources to do its duty." A number of exhibits at this year's Frankfurt motor show demonstrate that this was more than mere lip service by the Volkswagen chief executive.

The most striking example was the VW Futura, an experimental model with features outlined and explained in an arena of gigantic mirrors flanked by video screens.

BMW had more difficulty in directing attention to a new diesel engine with a catalytic converter. Attention tended to be rivetted on the new BMW 850i, the star of the show.

A de luxe coupé with a 12-cylinder engine, the 850i looks much more harmonious at first hand than in photographs.

Another star of the show, the No. 2, is the Opel Calibra, which was unveiled by the world's No. 1 in women's tennis, Steffi Graf, with an accustomed wave of her winner's hand.

That was the culmination of an unveiling ceremony beginning with the car emerging from a cavern, swathed in fog, flanked by rhythmic jets of water, in the glare of spotlights and to the accompaniment of overture music.

Steffi, under contract to Opel, pleasantly announced that she so liked the looks of the successor to the Opel Manta she would soonest drive it straight home.

At the unveiling ceremony she had to make do with a scale model in wood.

Almost simultaneously Boris Becker, under contract to Ford, wrote his name in green felt-tipped pen across the bonnet of a white Escort convertible, a special series of which bearing his name is shortly to be marketed.

The Wimbledon and Flushing Meadow winners thus paid reverence to the motor-car, as befitted their advertising contracts with the respective carmakers.

At the Porsche stand a family affair, Ferry Porsche's 80th birthday, was celebrated in advance, as it were.


The Panamericana, a design prototype, was intended to describe a formal arc between the 25-year-old Porsche 911 and the Porsche sports car of the future.

It didn't meet with unqualified approval. One pundit dismissed it as being "like a BMW Z1 that has been repainted after a crash."


With a reference to Professor Porsche's four score years, another pundit said: "You can't give the old boy a buggy as a present!"

Tried and trusted means of gaining attention even when there is little that is new to be seen include hosting the tennis stars, emphasising the exotic appearance of a model, featuring its sheer good looks and pulling out all the stops of showman-

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Coming attraction. The Futura experimental Volkswagen. (Photo: VW)



DISCOVERY

Women's team heads for the Antarctic



The girls who are coming into the cold. (Photo: dpa)

Nine women are to pioneer equal rights in the Antarctic by spending 14 months as an all-female team in twin tubular steel containers that will be their living quarters and research laboratories.

From mid-December they will man the Georg von Neumayer research station, the Federal Republic of Germany's Antarctic base camp.

All are highly qualified and all have volunteered to spend a winter in the Antarctic in a spirit of adventure and scientific inquiry.

"I have always wanted, even as a child, to see the world. That was the motive behind my choice of university course," says geophysicist Monika Margarete Sobiesiak, 30.

Slim, smartly dressed, wearing fashionably large earrings, she self-assuredly faces the cameras and the Press at the Ministry of Research and Technology in Bonn.

The idea of sending an all-female team of scientists to take over from 10 successive all-male squads six metres (20ft) beneath the Antarctic ice was her brainchild.

She and fellow-geophysicist Estella Weigelt felt four years ago that it was high time women were considered, especially when their scientific and technical training was no less thorough and their qualifications were no less advanced than the men's.

Did they not otherwise work side by side on a basis of equality? In other words, here was a high-spirited, intelligent woman who knew just what she wanted, and a term of Antarctic research was it.

In the past women did not even apply for the job. "There was absolutely no point," an insider told the Press. Yet Frau Sobiesiak's idea was eventually taken up.

She drummed up support among women scientists, and in 1987 only women needed to apply.

Which only goes to show what progress women have made. Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber was amazed to learn that so many highly qualified women had applied.

Just as many would have been available four years ago, but they would then have stood no chance of being hired.

The nine pioneers all have husbands or companions in the Federal Republic. All readily agreed to let their wives or girlfriends spend a tour of duty in the Antarctic; some positively encouraged them.

Frau Sobiesiak's partner is a fellow-scientist. He didn't object to the idea for a moment. "That is extremely important if the research project is to succeed," she says.

None of the nine have children, which also makes the 14 months away from home less trouble.

Even so, spending a winter in the Antarctic is still a serious challenge. The nine will spend 14 months cut off from the outside world at a base camp where the mean temperature is -46.1° C and 120-180kph snowstorms are not unusual.

Conditions are cramped too. The steel tubes are containers that include nine living quarters, a galley and mess, a clinic, a laboratory, a workshop, a wireless operator's room, two generator rooms and a snow-melting facility.

The women have undergone endurance tests in the Ötztal Alps and were selected partly on the basis of their physical and mental stamina and ability to work in small groups.

At present they are being taught how to handle the technical and scientific equipment they will be using in the base camp. These preparations will take five months.

As in the case of present and past all-male crews, the station manager is a doctor. Her staff will be two meteorologists, two geophysicists and four technicians (whose work will range from radio officer to cook).

The two youngest women are 27, the oldest is 33.

They already know each other well. All are keen to see an all-female team get on with only each other for company for 14 months.

Problems can arise irrespective of sex where so many people are so utterly dependent on each other for so long in such cramped quarters.

But it could also be an opportunity to make friends for life.

"We are firmly resolved to discuss the least difference of opinion frankly the moment it arises," says one member of the squad.

Barbara Frandsen

(Der Tagesspiegel, Berlin, 17 September 1989)

Continued from page 8

ship. As Boris Becker could only appear once, Ford attracted its public by staging a multi-media laser show.

As Steffi Graf couldn't make daily appearances at the Opel stand either, the Calibra show alternated with a show featuring the Opel Vectra and other good-looking girls.

What was more, a young and dynamic group of dancers disco-danced their way round an estate car while a master of ceremonies lauded the leisure features of yet another Opel model.

A miniature test track could be admired opposite the Opel stand. Remote-controlled scale models of the four wheel-drive Opel Vectra hurtled round the track.

Then there was an inclining testbed on which visitors were shown how the engine's power was shifted from one axle to the other as the gradient changed.

Volvo recalled a successful US advertising campaign in which test dummies were used. In Frankfurt they were real people with robot movements.

Audi demonstrated the quality of its corrosion-resistant bodywork outside the motor show entrance, where the bodywork of an Audi 80 was immersed in a salt-water aquarium.

Young women stood nearby with placards and sandwich-boards. What looked like demonstrators turned out to be part of the publicity.

They were part of an Audi campaign to persuade more women to try their hand at mainly men's trades.

The company needs more qualified staff. Without them it is unlikely to be able to manufacture the experimental convertible that was unveiled at Frankfurt.

Seat, the other Volkswagen subsidiary, is best known for manufacturing the least expensive Western-made compact, the Seat Marbella, which is sold for DM9,330 in Germany.

At Frankfurt, Seat featured the Proto T, an attempt to gain a reputation for being more than a maker of inexpensive cars.

Designed by Giorgio Giugiaro, the streamlined exterior adds style and good looks to an interior which includes a number of new design ideas.

The back seats, for instance, can not just be reclined; they can be recessed.

What is more, the Proto T is at present the most streamlined experimental model there is, with a drag coefficient of 0.243.

Figures such as this, which sound so academic, guarantee that the assembly-line model will use less fuel. The less fuel a car uses, the less it is likely to pollute the environment, which should help silence the car's critics on the home front.

But European carmakers are also engaged in battle on the Far Eastern front, which at Frankfurt was in Hall 9, where Japanese cars were on show, as were the models manufactured by Austin Rover, who stand accused of having let the Japanese get a foot in the European door by joining forces with Honda.

Some of the new models exhibited by Japanese carmakers at Frankfurt ought to make the Europeans shake in their shoes. They include the new Toyota Celica coupé, the new Mazda 323 range and the new Honda Accord.

But Japanese automotive quality and good looks are not what upsets European carmakers. As Renault's Raymond Levy put it:

"We in the European Community stand for free and fair competition. But there probably isn't even a word for it in Japanese.

"The Japanese are making not the slightest attempt to strike a balance in trade with us; they want to beat us hollow."

"Speed is the only modern pleasure," wrote Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World*. That no longer applies to the motor-car.

The erstwhile symbol of individual freedom has become synonymous with the masses. Yet the Frankfurt motor show opened up approaches that may make it possible to live on with the automobile.

Ralph Boeddeker/Hanns Jürgen Trocha

(Welt am Sonntag, Hamburg, 17 September 1989)



Aspiring. Hamburg across the Elbe. Unknown artist, late 17th century. (Photo: Catalogue)

■ EXHIBITIONS

The watery way from riverbank camp to modern, industrialised city

The development of Hamburg from refuge camp and ship's landing on the River Alster lowlands to an international port is portrayed in an exhibition at the Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte.

Items have been lent by 204 donors from all over Europe to reconstruct an immense panorama of the Hanseatic League (also called Hanse or Hansa) as a European phenomenon.

The Hanseatic League, an association of merchants and towns which was never formally established but which served to promote international trade, opened up and controlled trade in the North Sea and Baltic Sea regions between the 14th and 16th century.

It initiated developments without which subsequent progress in these fields would have been inconceivable.

The league created markets, established shipping routes, gave impetus to the arts and crafts, and influenced the culture and the constitution of towns from Flanders to Russia.

It broke up during the 17th century after trade began to concentrate on Eastern Asia and America.

The territorial states gained the upper hand in Germany and the Hanseatic League suffered serious losses as a result of the Thirty Years War.

A revival

The Hanseatic idea was revived in the 19th century when the last three of the former *Reichsstädte*, Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck, tried to assert their independence and the Wilhelminian empire (William II) strived for naval power.

The German word *hanseatisch* was preferred to the word *hansisch*, since the former denoted a combination of farsightedness and daring.

The German term *Hansa* is still used today as an indication of the highest quality and of sophistication.

The Museum für Hamburgische Geschichte is being advised by 60 scientists. Their efforts are helped by new interdisciplinary research in political, art, cultural and economic history.

Excavations have furnished more information. Everything in any way con-



nected with the Hanseatic League was examined for the exhibition.

Many uncertainties and questions remain, for example, was the Hanseatic League a league of towns, an alliance or just a community of interests and which towns were really Hanseatic?

The exhibition is divided into six sections. The first deals with the historical development of the towns and presents documents, seals, coins, town charters and treasury invoices together with models of the towns.

In terms of populations today the towns at that time, with between 3,000 and 14,000 inhabitants, were astonishingly small.

The second section shows the establishments of the Hanseatic League, including those in London and Bergen, outlining their privileges, the ground plans and their facilities.

The strict regulations for persons staying in the League's lodgings and in the drinking rooms are also on display.

The third, *Kaufleute und Waren* (Merchants and Goods) is particularly varied. An impressive aspect is the amount of "tools of the trade" a merchant needed: writing implements, clocks, measuring devices and the absolutely essential scales.

The exhibition gives a rough idea of the variety of goods traded and transported by sea and by land, e.g. dried fish, salted butter, hops or malt.

An interesting model shows how the Hamburg mills worked and how waterpower was utilised by various installations. The section *Transport und Verkehr* (Transport) demonstrates how the development of technology turned into the determinant factor.

The Viking ship developed into the bulky Hanseatic "Kogge", which is displayed at the exhibition in the form of the Bremer Kogge of 1380.

This ship was a large, manoeuvrable and fast ship and could travel at a speed of roughly 10 knots, a good 18 kilometres per hour.

A journey from Hamburg to Gotland and back took about 12 weeks. The "Hanse-Kogge" was soon replaced by the smooth and much faster carvel-built ships.

Many visitors to the exhibition will be surprised at the fact that nautical sciences, nautical maps and navigational aids developed at such a slow pace.

The fifth exhibition section *Hansestadt* describes the various aspects of culture which existed in the towns at that time.

With the help of many examples of sacral art the connection between religious beliefs and maritime trade becomes clear. Saint Nicolas, for example, was the patron saint of seafarers.

The depictions of ships on altars could take up a section of their own. This section also recalls day-to-day life in the towns and the implements, including toys, used.

The final section examines the later stages of the Hanseatic League up to the present day. A detailed look is taken at the pirate Klaus Störtebeker, whose execution reinforced the power and rights of the Hanseatic League. In this section we find the Spanish-Dutch costume of the Hamburg Senators, which was worn in Hanseatic pride up until 1810 and then once again between 1871 and 1918. Visitors really need to read the exhibition catalogue to be fully informed, but this requires a lot of time and patience. Effort well invested, however, since the two volumes with their 1,328 pages have pictures of almost all the items. At a price of just DM40 a true gift for the lucky buyer.

Karl Veit Riedel
(Nordwest Zeitung, Oldenburg, 19 September 1989)

The Ruhr gets an airing in New York

The arts in the Ruhr are getting a public airing for a month in the Brooklyn Academy of Music in New York.

Professor Paul Vogt, managing director of the Ruhr Cultural Foundation, said the decision of the academy, one of the most important music institutions of its type not just in New York but anywhere, was "an exceptional event."

A glance at the exhibition poster already shows that the Ruhr area is full of contrasts: the ballet dancer Christine Brunel can be seen in front of the photograph of a factory floor.

The organisers decided to do without a grand public inauguration, opting instead for a dinner party for 300 guests in the Cloister, a vast building north of Central Park which has been pieced together from various parts of European cloisters by rich Americans.

Apart from Paul Vogt the president of the Ruhr Foundation, Berthold Beitz, and North Rhine-Westphalia Premier, Johannes Rau, were among the distinguished guests.



The exhibition programme is markedly orientated to the current interests of Americans in the German "scene", presenting new trends in the fields of music, dancing and dance-theatre.

Johannes Rau remarked that, if asked to give the Ruhrworks a motto, he would fall back on a remark made by Albert Einstein, who once said that an atom is easier to split than a prejudice.

Most Americans are at most familiar with the Ruhr region as a major coal and steel producing area. The exhibition tries to presents an "exciting cultural landscape."

Referring to the "melting pot New York" Rau said that Claus Peymann, the former director of the Bochum theatre company, may have been right when he claimed: "The Ruhr region is New York,

Continued on page 12

Structural changes. (Photo: Kulturstiftung Ruhr)

■ ARCHITECTURE

Getting democracy into bricks and mortar



The new Australian parliament building designed by the architect Aldo Giurgola in Canberra is geometrically structured like the baroque residence of some absolutist ruler.

Seen from a distance the multiform group of four-storey, stone-panelled buildings merges into the green and hilly city landscape which surrounds it.

Only a steel tower on four sloping pedestals, with an Australian flag flying from its spire, towers above the edifice as a symbol of the fact that this is no ordinary location. It is the constructed heart of Australian democracy.

The architectural superlative, which is vaguely reminiscent of a medieval Stadtkrone, could be easily mistaken for an ultramodern industrial complex or an unusual ensemble of hotel buildings.

From the outside it is the organic and formal quality of this parliamentary architecture which impresses most, whereas the interior is marked by a profusion of expensive details, precious materials and sophisticated colourfulness.

The former British colony of Australia has visibly spared no expense to treat itself to a magnificent dream building which almost makes interior of the House of Commons in London look like a shabby and dilapidated room.

The entrance hall of the new parliament, where citizens and MPs can mingle reveals a noble ambience in white-and-green marble and has the atmosphere of an expensive boutique.

Visitors tend to be overawed by so much lavish beauty and perfection. The luxurious interior does not exactly help bridge the gap between parliament and the man on the street.

Yet most Australians are convinced that their new parliament is the ultimate in the way of "democratic architecture."

Admittedly, this "democratic architecture" experts often talk about is as non-existent as a democratic roast joint.

No architectural style or shape exclusively signals dictatorship or democracy. The classicistic column does not inevitably stand for tyranny and the spacious pyramid roof is not an automatic guarantee for parliamentary control beneath it.

Democratic control can be exercised from a cold and uninviting castle and dictatorship imposed from a transparent glass palace.

The architectural shape in itself is innocent. It is the result of intellectual, social, political and economic determinants and can only be interpreted in terms of the context in which the people "use" it.

Carlo Schmid once wrote: "Democracy is the opportunity to humanise the state." Architecture in a democracy can help give citizens the feeling that they are not mere vassals or bureaucratically administrated numbers.

How buildings should be constructed in a democracy, however, is more a question of "should-nots" rather than clearly defined positive guidelines. Architecture should not be emotive, should not have heroic appeal and should not consist of intimidating monumentality.

Buildings such as Hitler's megalomaniac monstrosities, which aroused "fear and fascination", are inappropriate in a democracy. Democracy can do without grand palaces.

It should not, however, lack all majestic dignity or be wrapped too plainly. Democratic architecture and quality are not a contradiction in terms.

Representation in a democracy is not presumptuousness, order is not coercion, and a pronounced affinity to architectural sophistication does not automatically suggest violence.

Democratic architecture should try to express values such as elegance, graciousness and accessibility.


In this sense the Philharmonie in Berlin (Hans Scharouns) and the Munich Olympics buildings (Günter Behnisch) rank as the outstanding architectural achievements of post-war years.

The transparent Olympic tent roof in Munich achieved the feat of conveying to a world which still had the sound of the Nazi goose-step ringing in its ears the sight of cheerful games and the image of a new Germany.

Architecture is a political symbol. The content and objectives of architecture in democracy are almost always discussed with reference to city halls and parliaments as examples.

The unstable relationship between the people as the sovereign and its elected representatives is probably most manifest in this context.

The architect Hans Schippert, whose plenary hall built in just three months in Bonn in 1949, transparent and flooded with light, was intended as a "house of openness", wanted the "German people" to be able to watch parliamentary activity. He countered the accusation of frugality by saying: "Some people feel that the parliamentary building should be more ceremonious. We shall build such a building when politics can again boast successes." As regards such successes there is still a great deal to be desired. The architect Günter Behnisch, who has been struggling with plans for a substitute for the dilapidated Bundestag plenary hall which has now been pulled down for sixteen years and has almost despaired in the face of the indecision and contradictory behaviour of his "clients", wants anything but a ceremonious building: "If everything works out well a differentiated and well-tempered ensemble divided into small sections will be constructed." Behnisch's perfectly circular plenary hall and his typical intelligent architectural style continued the tradition of Schwippert's unemotive concept of architecture, developing it even further imaginatively in line with contemporary demands.



Room for debate . . . model of new plenary hall for the Bundestag in Bonn. (Photo: dpa)

The architect Hugo Häring claimed that a house always makes a political confession.

The parliamentary building currently being designed by Behnisch shows that the "house of democracy", which experiences constant change in the form of changing majorities, can be a pleasant, open and inviting building, able to combine casual dignity with emancipated composure.

Architecture can make a political programme and its underlying concept of the individual visible.

In the case of the Bonn plenary hall the architect's concept of the interested and responsible citizen is miles ahead of that of many politicians.

The genesis of architecture in democracy is just as important as the final product.

Whether and how the construction of a building was implemented against the will of the public or whether bureaucrats ruined the imaginative quality of an architect's draft by being petty-minded and penny-pinching are just as significant to architecture in democracy as the people who represent a building to the outside world.

If unfriendly and arrogant town hall employees give people seeking advice a dressing-down the architectural design of the building is pretty irrelevant.

To guarantee a good final product architecture in democracy requires harmonious cooperation between the architect and his client.

If an architect is left alone to fight against indecisive bureaucrats or politicians who are only interested in the next election date quality is bound to suffer.

The real dilemma of Bonn's building policy is the unwillingness and inability shown for decades by Bonn's parliamentarians to do more to make sure that the parliamentary building is more than just an accumulation of shabby segments.

Bundestag Speaker Rita Süssmuth put it all in a nutshell: "Under the conditions which exist in Bonn the buildings for the 1972 Olympic Games would not have been finished until the year 2000."

In Düsseldorf, where the new state assembly (Landtag) was finished in autumn 1988, the architects Eller, Moser, Walter & Partners were fortunate to have clients who knew what they wanted and did not leave their ideas to gather dust in some office drawer.

The Landtag invited tenders and awarded the contract to the winner of the first prize.

Unfortunately, the architects were unable to assert the fragile elegance of their prizewinning draft against harsh reality.

From the outside the Düsseldorf Landtag looks like a space station with its impressive concave-convex curvature, circles and lines.

Despite all the clever subdivisioning of the huge construction, however, there is still an impression of overpowering monumentality.

Nevertheless, the Landtag is an inviting building, in which the feeling of *Bürgernähe* exists to a greater extent than in any other comparable building.


No walls, railings or barbed-wire prevent direct contact between citizens and their parliament.

Joggers run along the Rhine next to the building and people can go for a stroll directly beneath the projecting plenary hall.

Through an open door the employees of the Landtag can make their way straight down to the river from the one-storey restaurant with its beautiful view [illegible] no police pa- [illegible] and no windows

Continued on page 12

Wheeling and dealing . . . the new Düsseldorf Landtag assembly. (Photo: Poly-Press)



■ DRUGS

War has been declared, but a strategy still needs to be worked out

Some time this week the year's 600th drug death will be reported from somewhere in Germany, while in Colombia the government has declared war on a cocaine mafia that has decided Western Europe is a new market with bumper growth potential.

President Bush has launched a campaign against narcotics, which he sees as *the most serious threat to the nation.*

At the United Nations in Vienna the heads of national narcotics enforcement agencies were welcomed by director-general Margaret Anstee with the words:

"None of us wanted a war, but now we have begun it we must win it."

Campaigns against hard drugs have never yet been won, says Hans Harald Bräutigam. True enough. But in the past, to keep to a terminology that conveys some idea of the threat posed by and the earnest of the problem, only raiding parties have been sent out.

Governments have not yet authorised the use of all legal means, although no-one would deny any longer that narcotics pose a threat to all societies that have reached a certain standard of living.

Coordinated international cooperation has only just begun — now time is fast running out.

Pessimists say it has already done so, which is why they propose legalising addictive drugs (and only they are meant in this context).

A fundamental decision is at stake. Is *society to capitulate to the problem of* 80,000 drug addicts and the crimes they commit to come by money with which to buy their drugs?

Is society to give up in view of the several hundred million marks' worth of direct and indirect damage done? Is it to legalise hard drugs, which by definition make their users sick and addicted?

Is the state, which is vociferously called on to ban dangerous medical drugs and harmful food additives, at the same time to organise and even bankroll



supplies of surrogate Methadone for addicts?

A decision must definitely be reached soon. By 1992 at the latest a uniform *strategy will need to have been adopted in* the European internal market. Drugs have long been a common European problem.

The inevitable domestic debate is marred by three special features. The one, understandably, is that established facts and figures are few and far between.

There may be 80,000 addicts, but there could easily be twice or three times as many.

What is more, well over 600 people will have died this year as a result of drug addiction.

Not all of them, after all, die in station toilets with used needles in their hands. What is more, the figures quoted are invariably the lowest estimates. It is as though the problem were not to be underlined to its full extent.

Second, intentionally and unintentionally, the debate is not conducted along honest lines.

Those mainly interested in the addicts are the addicts' families. The general public may clamour for something to be done about addiction, but what they really mean is the adjunct of addiction: crime.

This crime affects them directly as, to a lesser degree, does the spread of Aids via prostitution to earn money with which to buy drugs.

What do we want? To protect the general public or to help the addicts? These are different tasks that require different strategies.

Third, there is a strange reluctance to admit that the present strategy of voluntary treatment is what it is: a costly flop.

The belief that post-withdrawal care and attention can eliminate the causes of addiction is disproved by failure rates of 95 per cent and more.

New approaches must be discussed, if need be regardless of opposition by those who claim, without being able to prove it, that individual addiction is caused by circumstances for which society is to blame.

Before any government measure is undertaken, a further point must probably be raised.

It is that if addicts are felt to have only themselves to blame for their addiction, methods other than those which would be suitable for the sick might seem advisable.

If addicts are sick, then they are entitled to treatment and, if possible, to a cure — although, of course, they must make a personal contribution toward their cure.

At present, views and responses vary between these two extremes.

An anti-narcotics strategy that befits the rule of law can neither capitulate to addiction nor punish addicts as having only themselves to blame and leave them to their own devices.

It must try to help and cure them. Methadone is sure to play an increasingly large part in treatment, both to wean addicts off hard drugs and to help those who have grown too weak to survive withdrawal symptoms without assistance of this kind.

Yet Methadone is not the answer if it is only to be a long-term surrogate for addicts who would like to switch to an alternative drug but have no intention of breaking with the habit.

The right to assistance is matched by the duty to make the greatest possible personal contribution by way of self-help.

A number of inferences may be drawn. The narcotics problem must be dealt with from various angles, due in part to the bitter but realistic insight that there is no such thing as a full-scale, fully-fledged, all-inclusive solution.

Swift successes can thus not be expected, and common sense must rate it a step forward if the high growth rates in supply and demand are reduced to some extent.

All narcotics squad officers know well enough how to make life hard for dealers. Here are a few suggestions:

- Confiscate all ill-gotten gains. In cases of doubt the suspect must prove he has earned his assets by legal means.

Governments will need to agree on the terms of an agreement by which banks are required to notify the authorities of accounts when certain grounds for suspicion apply.

- Standardise penalties for drug offences in producer and consumer countries.
- Step up international cooperation in keeping a lookout for drugs and dealers.
- Confiscate all vehicles and items used to transport narcotics.
- Impose a driving ban on commercial dealers.
- Make foreign nationals who deal in drugs in the Federal Republic liable to forfeit their right of abode, deport them and refuse them re-entry — even after serving a prison sentence — into any European Community country.
- With all due respect for the confidential nature of banking and bank accounts, laundering narcotics proceeds involves banking transactions.

Banks must either keep a closer watch on these transactions and report them to the authorities or be prepared to permit the authorities a limited right of inspection and control.

Cuba and Colombia will have demonstrated to any governments of producer countries that may have harboured doubts on the subject that large-scale narcotics production is a threat to law and order.

It is at least worth trying to stem the tide of coca growing in Latin America and opium poppy growing in Asia by offering farmers alternative means of earning a living.

More could also be done nationally, such as:

- Teaching children to steer clear of drugs from as early an age as possible at school.

There is much that they are not yet taught, such as the increasingly sophisticated and brutal methods dealers use to make kids addicted.

- Dealers need peace and quiet in which to go about their business. Parents have started to set up vigilante groups to put paid to peace and quiet where drugs are known to change hands.
- If dealer networks are to be permanently broken up, addicts who deal on a small scale to earn money for their own consumption will need to be punished with the full rigour of the law.

That would mean a prison sentence *and* no more dope; not a pleasant prospect for either the offender or the state. But penalties and a deterrent are indispensable for a strategy that is to function.

- Addicts caught committing a crime to come by money with which to buy drugs must also be forcibly kept out of reach of narcotics.

That may not sound pleasant, but forcible incarceration and/or treatment are already practised where other complaints are concerned.

Besides, addicts are by definition no longer capable of deciding for themselves what they want to do.

- The high dropout and failure rate among addicts who undergo voluntary treatment show that individual causes of addiction continue to exist. More research is urgently *needed* here.
- Those who have succeeded in breaking with the habit face fresh problems. They have usually missed the boat jobwise, always assuming they ever had a trade or profession.

So job training programmes and manpower schemes must be provided — and financed by the state.

None of these moves, not even all of them, seem likely to solve the narcotics problem entirely. But they might succeed in the first step, that of stemming the tide or even reversing the trend.

A full-scale education and information programme has failed to eliminate Aids for that matter, but — at least for the time being — it has generated an awareness of the need to behave responsibly.

Narcotics are, similarly, an individual and a social threat, due in part to organised crime in connection with drugs and the proceeds of trading in them.

Social peace and the feeling of security may even be in jeopardy. We can no longer afford to ignore the problem or to leave the police or the courts to deal with it. War may have been declared, but we still need a strategy.

Horst Bieber

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 15 September 1989)

Continued from page 11

with bulletproof glass. The motto that democracy lives on trust is visible here.

With no noticeable threshold citizens can move into the entrance hall, which is the really fascinating part of this building.

This room is so bright and inviting that the sky seems to fall into it.

The circular plenary hall is flooded by light. Without any hierachical face-to-face of government and Opposition parties the discussions which develop will probably be much friendlier than in the unfriendly confrontation of the old Bundestag plenary hall.

The atmosphere of the 12-metre high plenary hall is functional but not cold.

Futuristic interior design or the multifariousness of colour and material characterising the Australian parliament building were not wanted in Düsseldorf. There is a restrained modernity without stylish compromise.

Although it may not be a forward-looking construction the Düsseldorf Landtag has a distinctive character. This is already a rarity for democratic architecture.

Ingeborg Flagge

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 15 September 1989)

Continued from page 10

it just doesn't know it." During the programme the German dance theatre will be presenting itself in performances by Reinhild Hoffmann, Susanne Linke and Christine Brunel.

Twelve performances and discussions on the trends of modern dance theatre between American and German experts are planned.

Klaus Pöhe's experimental rock band *Aktive Musik* will also put in an appearance.

A film festival entitled "Focus on the Ruhr" will be showing documentary films on the development of this area from the early days of coal mining to the crisis and recent structural changes facing the industry. Wicki's *Das Wunder des Malachias* and Wim Wenders' *Alice in den Städten* are among the films to be shown.

The programme will be accompanied by a multitude of art and photo exhibitions, the most outstanding of which is the presentation of watercolours by Christian Rohls from the Essen Folkwang Museum.

The envisaged readings by the author Christoph Wackernagel will probably have to be cancelled, since the ex-terrorist and subsequent theatre editor for Claus Peymann has not yet been granted an entry visa.

Wilm Herlyn

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 16 September 1989)

■ SCIENCE

Physicists want nothing other than chaos

No one would imagine that research scientists at Hanover University's department of quantum physics want to create chaos. But, for two years, they have been trying to create little else.

Their first chaotic success was in November 1988. They use laser beams and a powerful computer and the result has nothing to do with political ideologies or rooms laid waste.

The chaos is purely for research: the scientists, like others all over the world, are looking into a phenomenon that occurs in many sectors of life and scientific disciplines.

There is a sudden irregularity in a patient's heartbeat. Or a laser suddenly emits a flicker of light instead of a beam.

Despite detailed calculations, certain stars defy attempts to work out their orbits. Not even the largest computer can come up with accurate weather forecasts.

These inexplicable features of tests and experiments used to be dismissed as errors. Scientists now feel they have discovered a system behind many of these irregularities or inaccuracies.

Discrepancies frequently appear to be based on specific rules.

Hanover quantum physicists did not want to wait until one of their experiments ran into problems in order to get a closer look at the phenomenon. They created *their* own chaos. They passed a laser beam through a large number of sodium atoms. Sodium atoms absorb light and with it energy which they release shortly afterwards.

The atoms alternate between these two energy states, supplying physicists with long sets of frequency figures.

If the intensity of the light emitted is increased, and with it the energy fed to the sodium system, the frequencies will first increase regularly — until a chaotic reaction occurs.

Success was achieved in mid-November 1988. Chaos arrived and instruments duly whirred madly and with increasing irregularity.

What the physicists still lack is the formulas by which to describe this chaos accurately as a theorem.

Chaos cannot just be created by complicated physical experiments; it can also result from a dripping water tap. The drops first fall at regular intervals.

Open the tap a little more and the rhythm will change, but still be regular. Periodic frequency doubles until drops fall into the sink totally irregularly.

Rapid progress in developing powerful computers is the reason why chaos theory interests a growing number of scientists.

Experiments supply long sets of figures in which regularities or patterns can only be ascertained with the aid of powerful computers.

The American physicist Mitchell Feigenbaum says the figure 4.669 constantly recurs during periodic doubling. Chaos research scientists feel it is a significant figure, but they don't know why.

The theory of chaos was drawn up by the French mathematician Poincaré at the end of the 19th century. It calls a fundamental conviction held by many scientists into question: the belief that every phenomenon can be measured, expressed in terms of equations and then forecast.

It also shakes the foundations of another fundamental scientific assumption: that the universe can be explained once it is dissected into sufficiently small units and investigated.

Chaos research has in contrast shown that a system may react to an almost infinite number of influences and become chaotic the moment a minute change occurs in one of these factors.

The weather, for instance, is not the mere sum total of its constituent parts; it is something totally different because all its factors, such as wind, rain and sun, exercise a reciprocal influence on each other.

Meteorologists are fond of citing as an example the wing-beat of a Peking butterfly that may trigger a tornado in Japan.

This approach to chaos theory must not, of course, be overrated. Scientists have so far merely discovered a phenomenon and begun to describe it. They can't yet explain it.

Besides, many systems are sufficiently stable not to react to each and every minor influence.

Chaos research now extends to entirely different sectors. Ethologists hope it will help to account for outbreaks of aggression. Economists hope it will help to explain what often appear to be totally chaotic trends in the world of finance.

At the department of quantum physics in Hanover scientists may stress that their work is strictly basic research, but a practical application of chaos has already been found.

Research scientists at a leading electronics company were in despair because a newly designed motor rotated first clockwise, then anti-clockwise, without rhyme or reason.

The motor is now used to power electric lemon squeezers, in which the direction of rotation is immaterial.

Andreas Rinke

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 16 September 1989)

Radiation properties of clouds under joint-project probe

Scientists from four European countries have just started a major international project on cloud formations over the North Sea.

The Ice project, short for International Cirrus Experiment, involves British, French, German and Swedish scientists.

Until 25 October five research aircraft from three countries will fly missions from the Bundesmarine airfield at Nordholz, near Bremerhaven.

They include the German Stratolab, which is the first European research aircraft that can fly at altitudes of up to 18,000 metres (59,000ft).

Measurements taken on board these aircraft will be joined by readings taken on board a Kiel University oceanology department research vessel, by data from a research station on the North Sea island of Heligoland and from lidar equipment at Nordholz, Sylt and Norderney and by Meteosat satellite photographs.

The European Centre for Medium-Term Weather Forecasting in England, the German Meteorological Service in Offenbach and the Bundeswehr's defence geophysics unit in Traben-Trarbach will be supplying further data.

The project will be coordinated by Cologne meteorologist Professor Ehrhard Raschke.

Ice forms part of yet another international project, ISCCP, short for International Satellite Cloud-Climate Project.

Another part, Fire, short for First ISCCP Regional Experiment, is under way in the United States.

Fire will deal mainly with chubby cumulus clouds, which consist of water droplets. Ice will concentrate on cirrus, which are wispy high-altitude ice formations.

Both influence the greenhouse effect, each in their own way.

Cumulus clouds can put a damper on it by reducing solar radiation, whereas cirrus clouds can intensify it by letting solar radiation through but not heat reflected by the Earth's surface.

If climate trends are to be forecasted, detailed knowledge about both cloud types and their radiation properties is essential.

At present what we know about the part played by clouds is one of the weak spots in climate models.

In 1987 three aircraft spent three weeks flying over the North Sea to find unspoilt cirrus formations on which instruments and operators could be put

Frankfurter Allgemeine

through their paces. North Sea cirrus formations have again been chosen, partly because uncrowded air space is needed in which to fly in formation and at different altitudes through the cloud.

Besides, clouds form most evenly over the homogenous surface of the sea, which makes this maritime setting particularly suitable for scientific research.

Cirrus clouds are nothing unusual. About 30 to 40 per cent of the Earth's surface is under cirrus cloud cover.

They are formed when substantial air masses rise sky-high at the perimeter of meteorological fronts, when water and steam are sent by thunderstorms to tropospheric altitudes of between eight and 15 kilometres and from the condensation trail left behind by high-altitude aviation.

That, for instance, is why many a day that began without a cloud in the sky ends overcast at major international airports such as Frankfurt.

Yet cirrus clouds are very thin and airy. Where temperatures fall below -40° C they hover in layers of a few hundred metres over Central Europe.

They consist of ice crystals with a diameter of between a thousandth and a tenth of a millimetre, with a mere 100 or so crystals per 10 cubic metres of air.

Samples are now being taken of particles of this kind and taken deep-frozen to a research lab for examination.

Laser sensors chart silhouettes of them, cameras are used to subject them to holographic analysis, while other sensors measure their size in terms of the heat they emit on melting.

The turbulence of cirrus clouds, which is felt to play a most important part in their formation, is being measured by long "noses" attached to the research aircraft: rods nearly three metres (10ft) long with several holes in them.

Fluctuation in the pressure measured can be taken as a guide to the degree of cloud turbulence. But it will be months, if not years, before enough is known about these cloud formations.

Climate models can then be improved, however, and satellites will be able to take over the worldwide monitoring of cirrus cloud and its radiation properties.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 19 September 1989)

■ CHILDREN AND TELEVISION

Mixing up the real world with the fantasy one

For more than 60 per cent of German children, watching television is their main leisure occupation. The result can be behavioural problems. Guido Meyer reports for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt.*

Television is the most successful invention of the century. It has also had more influence than any other single invention.

In Germany, 64 per cent of all children watch TV for so long that it is their main spare-time activity; 42 per cent of 13-year-olds have their own set and watch an average of two-and-a-half hours a day.

A survey in the United States underlines just how much influence television exerts on daily life: every third American child is more prepared to go without a father than without the box. And here in this country, the number of cases of what psychologists call "TV addiction" is rising. This is being blamed for lack of concentration, otherwise unexplained decline in school performance and difficulties with raising children.

This addiction is an illness. Professor Herlbert Heinrichs, the former head of the audio-visual research centre at Hildesheim's university, recommends a thorough course of treatment.

In New York, two institutes have specialised in the topic: young people learn, in a programme called Anti-TV International, to live without television. Behaviourial difficulties resulting from intensive viewing can be got rid of.

Patients at the clinics come mainly from the 20 per cent of big-city families and 10 per cent of other families that are classed as television dependent. Most of the parents in these families are not able to regulate their own viewing and the children, through long hours of passiveness in front of the set inevitably turn into "vidioten."

An institute in Stuttgart which specialises in problems of raising children has found that one of the reasons for both physical and psychological disturbances through excessive television is that children become unable to distinguish real life from what they see on the screen. They transfer what they see in the unreal world into the real world.

One German television channel now says that its regular programme dealing with unsolved criminal cases (shown in the hope that members of the public will be able to provide information) is watched by one-and-a-half million children between the ages of eight and 13. Another 150,000 aged between three and seven watched.

What these statistics do not say is why they watch adult programmes despite the availability of children's programmes. Professor Heinrichs, who is a leading German media authority, lists five main reasons.

1. Children like doing what adults do. They are naturally inclined to emulate adult behaviour.

2. Most children feel they gain social prestige from having watched "a terrific programme." What they have viewed is often paraded in the schoolroom and in groups.

3. Children are more skeptical about programmes for them than adults realise. They accuse such programmes of often having cleverly disguised educational functions.

4. Children left alone at home at nights watch television. An analysis has revealed that more than half the parents do not know what programmes are watched. TV remains Germany's most popular babysitter.

5. Parents' behaviour. More parents than is commonly thought give their children enormous freedom to watch what they want. A University of Constance survey discovered that children with this excessive freedom tended to watch programmes that were not pedagogically sensible — as opposed to children from homes where the parents were more discerning.

Another consideration: a five-year-old child who shows signs for the first time of being able to follow a programme can already be classed as a television consumer.

Even two-month-old babies can take an interest in some programmes: they are interested in everything that moves. And it doesn't take a baby long to discover that something is moving in that box.

Many mothers say that their babies seek protection when something strange appears on the screen. Psychologist P. Ahrens has discovered that there is an especially sharp rise in the fear of the strange between the eighth and 14th months of life so that, during this time, television has for them a sinister effect. In this way, neuroses can originate.

Small children comprehend what appears on the screen as reality. One mother related that her 16-month-old daughter crept behind the set during the programme *Lassie* to see where the dog was when it wandered off the screen. "She was disappointed to find that the collie dog was not there."

Professor Heinrichs warned strongly against allowing children in their playpens to get near the TV set. This would result in the baby being forced to absorb certain picture details which could startle it and even shock.

But the invention of television has, like all things, another side to it. For a child, it is a window to the world. Whoever leaves windows open all day creates draughts, with the result that people catch colds and get ailments like rheumatics. But leaving the window closed all day hinders healthy development. Well-made children's programmes such as *Sesame Street* are directed at the learning capabilities of the child. The results are demonstrably positive.

Professor Heinrichs says older children should occasionally watch cops-and-robbers programmes in order to develop and broaden their critical faculties. But there should be a familiar person such as a parent or elder brother or sister by the child to defuse any fearful moments.

However, the problem does not only apply to children. It is not challenged that adults are affected. American scientists J. Hawkins and E. Buttler investigated 900 representative views in a three-year study. The result: intensive television over the years reduced the capacity to think. The researchers found that fears of one's own opinion grew out of all proportion because the medium came to be regarded as an authority. They described "dependence on television" as worse than the subjugation of a totalitarian group or party.

There is an especially strong influence wielded by violence on the box. The Hildesheim centre spent years using hidden cameras to observe routine acts of aggression in play groups, kindergartens and school classes. The conclusion: aggression is acquired through imitating or perhaps through success.

Acts of violence on television are transferred without change to aggressive behaviour in real life. For example, the youth who killed his family by putting powdered glass in their food after he saw it being done in an American television programme. The activities of a youth group were observed actually following the script of a programme with its threatening behaviour, shackling and physical assault.

There are no patent recipes for optimal treatment of television. Professor Heinrichs appeals for reasonable openness. He says it remains questionable whether those researchers who predict that audio-visual manipulation of people, especially children, long term would cause more devastation than the nuclear bomb would be proved correct.

Because people cannot survive without information supplied by television, the medium ought not be shoved to the periphery of the thought on the subject by parents and educational experts. It should be at the centre, he said.

Guido Meyer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 September 1989)

Problems, just problems, say teachers

RHEINISCHE POST

Children between the ages of three and six in homes that have access to cable television are particularly vulnerable viewers, according to a survey. They are also more aggressive and more disturbed, nervous than children with a small choice of programmes. They are easily distracted and quarrel more easily.

Dortmund University's social pedagogy institute questioned 234 kindergarten teachers in 93 kindergartens. Although the children watched principally children's programmes, the teachers inclined to a negative view of the affects of media on children.

Experts on the media, programme organisers and educationalists were invited to take part in a discussion on the theme organised by a state media authority in North Rhine-Westphalia, the Landesanstalt für Rundfunk.

There were manifold ideas about whether children should ever be exposed to television. The educationalists said the quality of programmes for children was not good enough. But the competition thatis developing, for such as viewing figures and making share are the buzzwords. Quality plays very much second fiddle.

The plans are for more programmes: RTL-Plus, a private company, plans children's news from next year; SAT-1, another private company, plans a children's quiz. But the latter wants, instead of offering programmes specifically for children, to tailor programmes for the entire family.

On the other hand, the head of the programming at the state-run Westdeutsche Rundfunk, Gert K. Müntefering, praised its children's programmes as "good, although there is room for improvement".

However, the decisive factor is not so much the actual programmes for children as watching habits. *The most important factor is child viewing in prime time when cops-and-robbers and other action programmes are shown, heavily interspersed with advertising.* Despite the numbers of young viewers, no children's programmes are shown at this time.

A social pedagogue, Dr Jürgen Rolle, wanted to know why the companies produced children's programmes at all. He was also critical of the adverts — 30 per cent used children; and children watched them keenly.

Dagmar Schulze-Oben, of a worker welfare organisation, said: "Children must be able to taste, smell and touch." The most important factors were being able to strengthen their belief in themselves and their ego. That would help shrink the viewing figures.

The attitudes of the kindergarten teachers towards the viewing of the children was increasingly against. Because of the overwhelming number of programmes transmitted, they often didn't know which the children had seen in order to make "an emotional follow-up", as media pedagogues advise.

Jürgen Spreemann

(Rheinische Post, Düsseldorf, 12 September 1989)

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■ HORIZONS

Tasting and smelling how great grandpa lived

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Is there anyone here who can milk a cow?" There is hesitation, giggling, and then a 12-year-old girl gingerly tries to coax a few squirts of milk from brown-dappled Anita's bulging udder into the silver-grey tin bucket.

They need some milk for the bread they plan to bake. A short while later the boys and girls, sweaty and covered with flour, are scrubbing out tins and carefully weighing pieces of dough on an ancient scale in a cramped, dark bakehouse dating from the last century. If all goes well, they will enjoy their own homemade bread for the first time at supper.

Six years ago, the Rhenish Open-air Museum in Kommern near Bonn became the first of about 60 museums to develop the project "Pupils Living in a Museum," which is offered to all classes from the fourth year of schooling on, including classes of handicapped pupils.

The point is not to have them "play history" for a week by taking a sentimental journey back to the "good old days." Rather, the teachers and the museum instructors want the pupils to experience their ancestors' past with their senses: by touching, smelling and tasting.

Most classes take months to prepare for their trip to the museum. The pupils read about the way country children lived 100 to 150 years ago, how they worked and what they learned in school. In Kommern this theoretical knowledge is then supplemented with experiences gathered in true-to-life reconstructions of farm villages typical of various Rhenish landscapes.

Laden with provisions, pots and pans, sleeping bags and foam-rubber cushions, and an axe for cutting firewood, the pupils and teachers move into their new lodgings, the historical ancestral home of the Mannesmann family of industrialists from Remscheid. There is a kitchen, two bedrooms, and a pantry for the mountains of food.

The past is experienced as vividly as possible: with cold water for washing, without an electric stove, and without a microwave oven for quick dishes. Instead, there is a massive coal stove in the kitchen on which the meals are cooked, and a wooden table, scoured till it shines, where the meals are eaten, discussions are held and work is done — that is, when the pupils don't happen to be wandering through the village, woods, meadows and fields on the museum's extensive grounds.

Bright and early in the morning, before the day's first visitors have even set out for Kommern, the boys and girls break up into small work groups for the various workshops and mews. On the first floor of a Westphalian half-timbered house dating back to 1744, for example, there is a small turner's workshop authentically equipped with tools that were in use before the work was done by machines: a large bench, a lathe with a hand-driven flywheel, well-worn files, pliers, wooden mallets and all sorts of chisels.

A craftsman who demonstrates traditional turner techniques to the daily visitors shows some of the pupils how to make a fancy keyboard from a simple piece of wood using a mallet and a wood chisel. In another house a few thousand metres away, two boys are sewing little leather pouches; they're learning about a saddler's work with their own hands. Another group of pupils has gone to the charcoal burner, who, in the woods far from the buildings of the museum village, is stacking wood into a giant, round pile. At the start of each week of the project "Pupils Living in a Museum," the wood is covered with loam and brush and carefully brought to a slow burn. Five days later, the boys are girls can see the result: charcoal, which in earlier times was used for heating.

Most of the young people know no more about the occupations demonstrated in the Rhenish Open-Air Museum than what they have read in their schoolbooks. So they are keenly interested in "grasping" the workaday world of their great-grandparents with their own hands. However, the relationship between the children and the craftsmen, and between the educational goals and the practical execution of the project, is not always a harmonious one.

Highly motivated pupils who have prepared themselves for months often find that the craftsmen, who have no pedagogical training, are unable to teach them what they want to know. And the boys and girls are often faced with closed doors because the morning's activities were not adequately coordinated.

Nevertheless, the museum stay is hardly ever too long for the pupils, and any discomfort or homesickness is usually forgotten after the first evening. The fascination of the unusual, a dash of adventure, and amazement at the industriousness of their ancestors contribute to making the experience a positive one. After all, what 12-year-old would want to miss the experience of helping to milk the cows and feed the calves?

"It was an awful drudgery back then," says one lad in describing his attempts at milking a cow and the amount of strength it cost to keep a thirsty calf from knocking over the pail of milk it was drinking from with a toss of its head. And his friend, who probably thought that children's work in earlier times was easier, now knows that minding goats is anything but "a piece of cake." When he tried to bring them into their stall from the pasture around noon, he learned that all the strength he could muster was no match for a stubborn goat. For other participants in the project, strength is less important than patience. Although everyone knows that spinning yarn is time-consuming, whoever visits the old countrywoman who demonstrates bygone household chores several times a week in the large kitchen of a half-timbered house from the Vorgebirge must bring along a lot of time and patience. For hours it seems as though the smell of smoke and greasy wool and the steady turning of the spinning wheel breathe new life into the old walls. Together with the old woman, the adolescents pluck apart clumps of wool and try to pedal the wheel at an even clip. They are glad for the chance to stretch when it is time to harvest tobacco and string up the leaves to dry.

It doesn't take long before all of the schoolchildren are freely roaming the grounds and examining every cranny of the past. What museum educator could be bothered by the pupils' finding the village pond, dotted with ducks, "romantic," the herds of pigs on the village meadow "cool," the squawking geese and bleating sheep "totally boss"?

At lunchtime — it goes without saying that buckwheat, *millet and other virtually forgotten "field fruits"* are cooked — the morning's experiences, impressions and problems are discussed along with plans for the afternoon. Should they build a half-timbered house? That means fashioning wooden beams into a house frame, filling in the panels between the beams and sticks and twigs, mixing a batch of loam and then covering the result with the thick goo. That's a lot of fun. Or how about a game of tag in which they criss-cross the centuries as they dash from one end of the museum grounds to the other? Or a visit to the old village school dating back to 1763? That would give the teachers an opportunity to show their pupils the conditions under which children of an earlier day had to learn — or perhaps more accurately, were allowed to learn, because an education back then was by no means a matter of course. How cramped and dark the classroom is, how strange that the teacher used to stand behind a massive lectern reaching to his chest, how terrible that corporal punishment was a normal occurrence, how tedious that children of all ages were taught together in one room!

"The good old days weren't so good after all." This assessment by one of the pupils is a common one, to which is added, "and when our grandmothers say that everything was better before, then it's probably only because they were young then and used to the work and the living conditions."

Another pupil had a similar comment: "In the old days things were totally different. There weren't any machines yet, and children had to work as hard as the grown-ups. But if we feel like it, we can just lie on the sofa at home, drink lemonade and read the paper."

Judith Grümmer

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 September 1989)



Muscle power is the only power here. Rhenish open-air museum. (Photo: Bernhard Eifrig)



What's your line, sir? Children film-makers at work in Frankfurt. (Photo: Ullrich)

Children go out and shoot their own films

Sabine is carrying the camera. Dragica is following with the heavy recorder on her little shoulder. Viviane is shuffling behind the two with the tripod. The three 9-year-old girls are roaming between Kleiner Ritter- and Klappergasse, the pub district in the Alt-Sachsenhausen section of Frankfurt. They want to shoot a film.

"This is their home," says Conny Gerig from the children's home on Affentorplatz. "Many of them live with their mothers — most of whom are single parents — in the neighbourhood. Around noon they eat in the fast-food restaurant and then come to us."

The girls' first stop: the "Downtown." It is early in the afternoon, and three men are sitting behind the bar. Without the least bit of nervousness, the girls carry their equipment into the dark pub, mount the camera on the tripod and set up the directional microphone.

There is a pause. The children huddle briefly, whispering: "What should we ask?" Viviane takes the initiative and approaches one of the men with the mike. "What do you do here all day?" she says. His friendly answer: "I'm the deliveryman. I bring the big kegs of beer and the wine."

Four camera teams from the municipal children's home on Affentorplatz are "on assignment".

The programme is part of the first "visionorama" organised by Frankfurt's youth welfare office in conjunction with the Hesse State Film Service. For a week children were offered 34 instructional media programmes at eight sites: photography, motion pictures and excursions to media production centres.

Educators know that children and teenagers are increasingly influenced by the media. "Daily schedules are determined by media programmes; communicative and behavioural patterns follow models in the media," says Detlef Ruffert, manager of the State Film Service. "The world of pictures influences one's awareness of reality."

The visionorama was designed to give children the opportunity to experience the camera actively, rather than simply sitting passively in front of a television set. As Viviane puts it, "Television is nice, but to make a film yourself is even nicer."

After the shooting was completed, the films were edited down to videoclips and shown at the International Children's Film Festival in Frankfurt's Film Museum.

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